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In America, fines are typically imposed without regard to income. The result 
is a system that traps low-income offenders in a cycle of debt and jail while letting 
rich offenders break the law without meaningful financial consequence. One-size-
fits-all fines also fail to meet basic goals of the justice system: to treat like offenders 
alike, punish the deserving, and encourage respect for the law. Elsewhere in the 
world, however, systems that assess fines based on earnings have been around for 
nearly one hundred years. The most common model—known as the “day fine”—
scales penalties according to a person’s daily income. These models are credited 
with ensuring proportionality in sentencing, improving the effectiveness of fines as 
a sanction, and even allowing fines to serve as an alternative to incarceration. 
They can also lead to startling results, such as a €54,000 speeding ticket assessed 
to a Finnish businessman. This Article is the first in-depth attempt to examine the 
constitutionality of a system of income-based fines that would levy significant fi-
nancial penalties on the wealthy. Ultimately, it concludes that potential constitu-
tional obstacles—arising primarily from the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment—are navigable, especially if a US system caps how high fines can go. 
As more people awaken to the burden that criminal justice debt imposes on the 
poor, this Article suggests that now may be an opportunity for a larger reconceptu-
alization of financial sanctions—away from the inflexible fine and toward income 
proportionality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When Americans break the law—whether it’s a minor offense 
like littering or a serious crime like felony assault—they tend to 
face the same financial penalties, no matter their income. But 
while a $250 speeding ticket means little to a millionaire, it’s 
roughly a week’s pay for someone earning minimum wage.1 The 
injustice of levying monetary sanctions without regard to means 
has nowhere been more on display than in Ferguson, Missouri, 
where discriminatory enforcement of the municipal code subject-
ed poor and black residents to fines they could not afford and in-
carceration for nonpayment.2 A policy that puts low-income of-
fenders in a cycle of debt and jail while letting rich offenders 
break the law without meaningful financial consequence is one 
that fails to meet basic goals of the justice system: to treat like of-
fenders alike, punish the deserving, and encourage respect for the 
law. A system that tailors fines according to income, by contrast, 
 
 1 See Minimum Wage (US Department of Labor), archived at 
http://perma.cc/AT9K-GFMM (stating that the federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour 
effective July 24, 2009). 
 2 See Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department *8, 56–58 (US Department 
of Justice Civil Rights Division, Mar 4, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ZK73-ZXGR. 
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would help to ensure that every person experiences a proportional 
penalty when she runs afoul of the law. 
Outside the United States, systems that assess fines based 
on earnings have been around for nearly one hundred years.3 
The most common model—known as the “day fine”—scales pen-
alties according to a person’s daily income.4 These systems are 
credited with ensuring proportionality in sentencing, improving 
the effectiveness of fines as a sanction, and even allowing fines 
to serve as an alternative to incarceration.5 But by their very na-
ture, day-fine systems can lead to startling results, as in 2015, 
when a €54,000 speeding ticket was assessed to a Finnish busi-
nessman caught going sixty-four miles per hour in a fifty zone.6 
While the benefits are clear, would American courts abide a sys-
tem that could slap Mark Zuckerberg with a million-dollar park-
ing ticket? 
Whatever the practical and political impediments to imple-
menting income-based fines in the United States, this Article 
argues that the federal Constitution is unlikely to get in the 
way. Potential obstacles—arising primarily from the Excessive 
Fines Clause—are navigable, especially if a US system caps how 
high fines can go. Critical to this conclusion is a topic that has 
received little attention: while courts and commentators have 
shown increasing interest in whether the Excessive Fines 
Clause prohibits imposing overly burdensome fines on the poor, 
there has been no in-depth examination of whether this clause 
limits imposing weighty fines on the rich.7 After discussing how 
fines are assessed in the United States, how income-based fines 
 
 3 Finland introduced the first day-fine system in 1921. See Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Post-
adjudication Dispositions in Comparative Perspective, in Michael Tonry and Richard S. 
Frase, eds, Sentencing and Sanctions in Western Countries 293, 306 (Oxford 2001). 
 4 See id at 307. 
 5 Id at 308. See also Edwin W. Zedlewski, Alternatives to Custodial Supervision: 
The Day Fine *7 (National Institute of Justice, Apr 2010), archived at 
http://perma.cc/LA8Z-YFAG. 
 6 See Finland: Speeding Millionaire Gets 54,000-Euro Fine (BBC, Mar 3, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/Q92H-KWFS. 
 7 There has been superb work on whether the Excessive Fines Clause prohibits 
the imposition of burdensome fines on the poor. See, for example, Beth A. Colgan, 
Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 Cal L Rev 277, 345–47 (2014). See also 
generally Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the Original Meaning of 
the Excessive Fines Clause, 40 Hastings Const L Q 833 (2013). On the other hand, legal 
scholarship about whether US jurisdictions could implement a day-fine system has so far 
avoided examining the Excessive Fines Clause. See, for example, Gary M. Friedman, 
Comment, The West German Day-Fine System: A Possibility for the United States?, 50 U 
Chi L Rev 281, 297–303 (1983). 
1872 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:1869 
	
work abroad, and the policy implications of such a system, this 
Article discusses why the Excessive Fines Clause and other con-
stitutional doctrines could shape, but ultimately should allow, 
implementation of income-based fines in the United States. 
Part I briefly reviews how fines are assessed in the United 
States and how income-based fines work abroad. Part II dis-
cusses some of the policy implications of scaling fines to income. 
Part III considers various constitutional impediments to imple-
menting income-based fines in the United States. Part III.A 
deals with equal protection, due process, the right against self-
incrimination, the line between civil and criminal adjudication, 
and the right to a jury trial. Part III.B—the bulk of this  
Article—grapples with the Excessive Fines Clause as well as a 
related subject: grossly excessive punitive damages awards. 
I.  THE TARIFF FINE AND THE DAY FINE 
Fines, which have always been a feature of the American 
justice system, became by the late nineteenth century the pre-
dominant punishment for petty offenses and economic crimes.8 
Today, fines are often the sole or primary form of punishment 
for low-level offenses like jaywalking—especially those consid-
ered civil rather than criminal.9 For graver criminal offenses, 
when incarceration is on the table, fines are typically imposed in 
conjunction with other sanctions.10 Although it could once be 
said that fines for serious crimes were unusual in the United 
States, the imposition of fines in such cases, levied on top of in-
carceration, is on the upswing: in 1991, only a tenth of felons 
 
 8 Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 61 (Simon & Schuster 2d ed 
1985) (describing a fine of one thousand pounds of tobacco in a 1660 Maryland proceed-
ing); id at 185 n 24 (discussing an early nineteenth-century New York law that punished 
the unlicensed practice of medicine by “a sum not exceeding twenty-five dollars”); id at 
595 (detailing the common use of fines in late nineteenth-century America). See also 
Southern Union Co v United States, 567 US 343, 349 (2012) (“Fines were by far the most 
common form of noncapital punishment in colonial America.”). 
 9 See, for example, Hawaii’s jaywalking statute, Hawaii Rev Stat § 291C-73(e) 
(specifying that “[e]very person who violates this section shall be fined $100”). See also 
Fines, Fees, and Bail: Payments in the Criminal Justice System That Disproportionately 
Impact the Poor *3 (Council of Economic Advisers, Dec 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6JRG-4VZG. 
 10 Susan Turner and Joan Petersilia, Day Fines in Four U.S. Jurisdictions *1 
(RAND, Mar 1996), archived at http://perma.cc/43FK-G8KQ. 
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sentenced to prison were fined; by 2004, it was a third.11 Those 
convicted of serious crimes but not sentenced to prison are even 
more likely to face fines.12 
Income typically plays little, if any, role in determining the 
size of a fine.13 Tariff schemes, which set fixed penalties for spe-
cific offenses, are common.14 In Florida, for example, every litter-
ing infraction triggers the same $100 fine.15 Where courts have 
leeway in setting fines, mandatory minimum and maximum 
penalties circumscribe that discretion. Pennsylvania, for in-
stance, punishes a repeat offense of driving under the influence 
with a fine of “not less than $300 nor more than $2,500.”16 Some 
laws expressly prohibit consideration of a person’s financial 
means in assessing the size of financial sanctions17 or presume 
 
 11 Alexes Harris, Heather Evans, and Katherine Beckett, Drawing Blood from 
Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 Am J 
Sociology 1753, 1769–70 (2010). 
 12 Id at 1770. 
 13 A note about terminology and the scope of this Article. Although a dizzying num-
ber of financial consequences can flow from encounters with the court system—from 
fines to fees, surcharges, interest and penalties, restitution, and forfeiture—this Article 
is concerned primarily with the traditional fine, that is, a “financial obligation[ ] imposed 
as a penalty after a criminal conviction or admission of guilt to a civil infraction.” Con-
fronting Criminal Justice Debt: A Guide for Policy Reform *6 (Criminal Justice Policy 
Program at Harvard Law School, Sept 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/N7QU-JRGH. 
This focus is no commentary on the relative importance of fines compared to other forms 
of criminal justice debt, such as “fees” imposed on offenders without regard to ability to 
pay, which can lead to a punishing cycle of debt and re-incarceration. See, for example, 
Alicia Bannon, Mitali Nagrecha, and Rebekah Diller, Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier to 
Reentry *13–20 (Brennan Center for Justice, Oct 4, 2010), archived at 
http://perma.cc/YU6H-75DM. That said, the concept that economic sanctions should be 
proportioned to financial means is applicable to many forms of criminal justice debt, and 
some US jurisdictions that have experimented with day fines have accounted for “non-
fine” economic sanctions by considering all such costs as “the fine” for the purpose of de-
termining an appropriate sanction. See Barry Mahoney, et al, How to Use Structured 
Fines (Day Fines) as an Intermediate Sanction *12 (Bureau of Justice Assistance, Nov 
1996), archived at http://perma.cc/RJ37-ZU3W. Restitution is, perhaps, another matter 
because it “is imposed only in cases in which specific and direct crime victims have in-
curred financial losses” and “restitution payments are allocated to these particular peo-
ple.” Katherine Beckett and Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction: Monetary Sanctions 
as Misguided Policy, 10 Crimin & Pub Pol 509, 510 (2011). 
 14 Sally T. Hillsman and Judith A. Greene, Tailoring Criminal Fines to the Finan-
cial Means of the Offender, 72 Judicature 38, 39 (1988). 
 15 See Fla Stat § 403.413(6)(a). See also Kala Kachmar, Municipal Courts Slam the 
Poor Hardest (Asbury Park Press, Dec 9, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/F3ZB-LCNX 
(describing how New Jersey’s “regressive municipal court fine system ‘clobbers’ the poor 
because the penalties are the same across the board—whether you’re a millionaire or 
living below the federal poverty line”). 
 16 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3804(a)(2)(ii). 
 17 See, for example, Cal Penal Code § 1202.4(c) (specifying that “[a] defendant’s 
inability to pay shall not be considered a compelling and extraordinary reason not to 
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that all defendants will be able to pay a fine.18 When income 
does factor in, it is to lower or eliminate a fine because a person 
lacks financial means rather than increase a fine in proportion 
to her income.19 Even when courts have the authority to waive or 
modify financial penalties for the poor—often after sentencing 
rather than when the fine is imposed—reports suggest they do 
so far too rarely.20 And despite Supreme Court decisions holding 
that incarceration for failure to pay criminal justice debt is ap-
propriate only if a person has the ability to pay but refuses to do 
so,21 in practice courts commonly ignore or skirt the requirement 
to examine a person’s means prior to incarcerating her for out-
standing debt.22 
In day-fine systems, by contrast, offender income plays a 
central role. First implemented in Finland in 1921, day fines are 
used across Europe and Latin America, including in Argentina, 
Austria, Colombia, Finland, France, Germany, and Sweden.23 
Although the specifics of each system differ—such as in how ex-
tensively they use day fines, how they calculate income and 
 
impose a restitution fine” and that “[i]nability to pay may be considered only in 
increasing the amount of the restitution fine in excess of the minimum fine”). See also 
Colgan, 102 Cal L Rev at 289 (cited in note 7). 
 18 See, for example, Iowa Code § 909.7 (“A defendant is presumed to be able to pay 
a fine. However, if the defendant proves to the satisfaction of the court that the defend-
ant cannot pay the fine, the defendant shall not be sentenced to confinement for the fail-
ure to pay the fine.”). 
 19 The United States Sentencing Guidelines, for instance, state that “[t]he court 
shall impose a fine in all cases, except where the defendant establishes that he is unable 
to pay and is not likely to become able to pay any fine.” USSG § 5E1.2(a). 
 20 See Bannon, Nagrecha, and Diller, Criminal Justice Debt at *13–14 (cited in note 
13); Confronting Criminal Justice Debt at *27–29 (cited in note 13). On the other hand, 
there is evidence that when judges do take income into account, they do so informally, 
and sometimes they impose alternative sanctions like incarceration or community ser-
vice on those perceived as unable to pay a fine. See Beth A. Colgan, Graduating Econom-
ic Sanctions According to Ability to Pay, 103 Iowa L Rev 53, 100 (2017). 
 21 See Part III.A.1; Bearden v Georgia, 461 US 660, 672 (1983). 
 22 See Bannon, Nagrecha, and Diller, Criminal Justice Debt at *19–20 (cited in note 
13). See also, for example, Investigation of Ferguson at *52 (cited in note 2) (describing 
the failure of courts in Ferguson to meaningfully take into account offender income when 
determining fines and consequences for nonpayment); In for a Penny: The Rise of 
America’s New Debtors’ Prisons *6 (ACLU, Oct 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/WN8J-
RPSH (recounting, among other stories, the experience of an unemployed single mother 
of two who was ordered to pay $300 or spend three days in jail because the court refused 
to entertain an alternative payment schedule); Louisiana v Hotard, 17 S3d 64, 69 (La 
App 2009) (vacating a one-year jail sentence imposed on an indigent defendant for 
failure to pay a $5,000 fine and ordering the trial court to consider the defendant’s 
financial status on remand).  
 23 See Albrecht, Post-adjudication Dispositions at 306–07 (cited in note 3); 
Zedlewski, Alternatives to Custodial Supervision at *3–5 (cited in note 5). 
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penalties, and whether caps limit how high a fine can go—the 
basic structure is the same: fines vary according to a person’s fi-
nancial means.24 Take the German system: An offense is first as-
signed a number of “fine unit[s]” based on its seriousness, from 5 
units, for the least serious, to 360.25 Next, courts determine a 
person’s daily income by, for instance, consulting public records 
and interviewing the offender.26 The amount of a fine is then cal-
culated by multiplying those numbers together. So for an offense 
carrying a punishment of ten units, a person with a daily income 
of €100 would pay a €1,000 fine, while a person with a daily in-
come of €50 would pay €500. 
Day fines are not entirely foreign to US shores. In the late 
1980s and early 1990s, a handful of US jurisdictions—the first 
in Staten Island, New York—performed limited experiments 
with day fines and saw encouraging results despite significant 
statutory and administrative constraints.27 Overall, these 
experiences suggest that day-fine systems have the potential to 
increase fine collection rates and reduce the attendant costs of 
nonpayment—such as warrants, arrests, and court appearances 
to collect debt.28 Revenue could also rise if statutorily imposed 
maximum fines are relaxed or lifted.29 Impressively, courts by 
and large proved able to ascertain offenders’ financial means 
and calculate the appropriate sanction, notwithstanding legal 
limits on access to information and resource constraints flowing 
 
 24 See Albrecht, Post-adjudication Dispositions at 308–14 (cited in note 3). The gen-
eral approach is to consider realized income alone, and not other assets, even though a 
more inclusive measure of financial circumstances would better serve the goal of propor-
tional punishment. Some systems, however, provide for taking capital assets other than 
income into account. Id at 312. 
 25 Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Sentencing in Germany: Explaining Long-Term Stability 
in the Structure of Criminal Sanctions and Sentencing, 76 L & Contemp Probs 211, 
215 (2013). 
 26 In Germany, courts do not have direct access to individual tax data. Mahoney,  
et al, How to Use Structured Fines at *23 (cited in note 13). In Scandinavian systems, 
they do. Albrecht, Post-adjudication Dispositions at 313–14 (cited in note 3). 
 27 The Staten Island experiment began in 1988, followed by tests in Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin; Maricopa County, Arizona; Des Moines, Iowa; Bridgeport, Connecticut; and 
four counties in Oregon. See generally Douglas C. McDonald, Judith Greene, and 
Charles Worzella, Day Fines in American Courts: The Staten Island and Milwaukee Ex-
periments (National Institute of Justice, Apr 1992), archived at http://perma.cc/7297-
X8KW; Turner and Petersilia, Day Fines in Four U.S. Jurisdictions (cited in note 10). 
 28 See McDonald, Greene, and Worzella, Day Fines in American Courts at *77 (cited 
in note 27). 
 29 In Staten Island, for example, estimates are that revenue would have risen by 
nearly 80 percent in the absence of statutory maxima. See id at *42. 
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from the temporary nature of the experiments.30 Nevertheless, 
“all U.S. courts that started day fine programs eventually 
terminated their efforts.”31 As one scholar has explained, 
America’s day-fine experiments were launched just as the 
“tough-on-crime furor of the late 1980s and early 1990s” reached 
its zenith, creating a toxic environment for less punitive 
criminal justice reforms.32 Today, while a few US jurisdictions 
provide for day fines by statute, there is little indication that 
courts use that authority.33 
II.  THE CASE FOR INCOME-BASED FINES 
A. The Benefits of Income-Based Fines 
A shift to income-based fines could have many benefits. For 
one, it would ensure that offenders of comparable 
blameworthiness experience similar punishments.34 Although 
 
 30 See id at *25–26; Turner and Petersilia, Day Fines in Four U.S. Jurisdictions at 
*76 (cited in note 10). 
 31 Zedlewski, Alternatives to Custodial Supervision at *10 (cited in note 5). 
 32 Colgan, 103 Iowa L Rev at 59–60 (cited in note 20). 
 33 In Alabama, “[d]ay fines or means-based fines” are listed in the statutory 
“[c]ontinuum of [p]unishments.” Ala Code § 12-25-32(2). Arkansas law directs the state 
Board of Corrections to establish “community correction programs,” such as “[e]conomic 
sanctions programs” that include “day fines.” Ark Code Ann § 16-93-1202(2)(B).  
Minnesota authorizes courts to, in some circumstances, “stay imposition or execution of 
sentence” and impose a day fine. Minn Stat Ann § 609.135(2)(b). Washington has a stat-
utory definition of day fines, Wash Rev Code § 9.94A.030(14), and, in the context of “drug 
offender sentencing alternative[s],” a state agency was directed to determine “rules for 
calculating the value of a day fine,” but that provision was removed in 2005. See 2005 
Wash Laws 460 § 1 (repealing Wash Rev Code § 9.94A.660(9)(b)(4)). Likewise, Virginia 
law directs the state sentencing commission to “[p]repare guidelines . . . for alternative 
sanctions which may include . . . day fines.” Va Code § 17.1-803(4). Puerto Rico appears 
to have the most extensive statutory authorization. See 33 Puerto Rico Laws Ann 
§ 4677(e) (allowing for day fines), § 4683 (establishing that a court “shall impose” such a 
penalty “in day-fine units taking into consideration the greater or lesser degree of the 
crime” with a minimum punishment of one day and a maximum of ninety days, and pre-
scribing that the “daily quota of the fine . . . shall range from one dollar . . . up to forty-
four dollars”), § 4687 (establishing that unpaid day fines may be converted into days of 
imprisonment). In Oklahoma, courts may impose what a statute calls “day fines”—a fine 
“calculated as a percentage of net daily wages earned” that may not exceed 50 percent of 
net wages. 22 Okla Stat Ann § 991a(A)(1)(y). Similarly, Kansas authorizes “day fines” 
but uses the term to mean that defendants may retire fines and other debts through the 
“performan[ce] [of] services for a period of days.” Kan Stat Ann § 12-4509(f)(11).  
Alaska Stat Ann § 12.55.036, which authorized the use of “day fines” for certain misde-
meanors, was repealed by 2009 Alaska Sess Laws 33 § 4. 
 34 Some theorists call this the “theory of just deserts,” though it is rooted in basic 
“concepts of fairness—fairness to other offenders (who could justly complain if this de-
fendant received a lighter penalty for the same conduct) and fairness to the defendant 
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imposing the same fine regardless of income is nominally 
consistent, true uniformity, the argument goes, requires 
subjective proportionality: punishments that are equally felt.35 
From the perspective of retribution, scaling fines to income 
would ensure that financial sanctions exact meaningful 
punishment on wealthy offenders. Such a system should also 
heighten deterrence for offenders with means, as one-size-fits-all 
fines likely deter the wealthy less than others.36 It is perhaps 
unsurprising, then, that some studies suggest upper-class 
 
(who could justly complain if he were punished more severely than other equally blame-
worthy offenders).” Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 Stan L Rev 67, 74 (2005). 
Whether or not the theory of just deserts is the right goal for punishment, our justice 
system appears tailored, at least in part, to serve this end. 
 35 Subjective uniformity, consistency in how a punishment is experienced, may be a 
goal of punishment, in addition to objective or nominal uniformity, for at least two 
reasons. First, effective deterrence would appear to rely on the subjective evaluation of 
punishment as much if not more than its nominal severity—an agoraphobic, for 
instance, will be less deterred by the prospect of home confinement. Second, from the 
perspective of retribution, sentencing an agoraphobic to home confinement would be 
insufficiently punitive. The distinction between subjective and objective uniformity is 
infrequently discussed, perhaps because when other punishments like incarceration are 
concerned, objective uniformity (every offender gets a year in jail) is considered 
reasonably likely to achieve subjective uniformity—offenders experience a year in 
custody in roughly the same way. This isn’t always so: a person with young kids may 
experience a year behind bars very differently from one without. Still, for all the 
differences between people, everyone’s day has twenty-four hours. Money is, on the other 
hand, quite unevenly distributed, meaning that nominally uniform financial 
punishments are particularly bad at achieving subjective uniformity. Moreover, even if 
nonpecuniary punishments lead to a comparably wide divergence between objective and 
subjective uniformity, monetary penalties can be more easily tailored to achieve 
subjective uniformity than most others by simply adjusting the amount to income. For a 
more detailed exploration of the subjectivity of punishment, see generally Adam J. 
Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 Colum L Rev 182 (2009). 
 36 Although whether a given penalty will in practice deter socially undesirable 
conduct is a vexing question, and one outside the scope of this Article, “[n]o one doubts 
that legal sanctions, civil and criminal, can have significant behavioral consequences.” 
Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Daniel Kahneman, Do People Want Optimal 
Deterrence?, 29 J Legal Stud 237, 237 (2000). For the purposes of this Article, I simply 
assume that the size of a penalty has some effect on a person’s decision to violate the 
law. Much research indicates, however, that people are more responsive to the likelihood 
of being caught than the size of a penalty. See Frase, 58 Stan L Rev at 72 & n 11 (cited 
in note 34). Some studies suggest that introduction of a fine can, under certain 
circumstances, increase the frequency of rulebreaking. See, for example, Uri Gneezy and 
Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J Legal Stud 1, 7 (2000). And there are significant 
reasons to believe that crime is driven less by the variables of deterrence than by a 
complex web of socioeconomic and other factors. See generally Alfred Blumstein and Joel 
Wallman, eds, The Crime Drop in America (Cambridge 2d ed 2006). 
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individuals are more likely to break the law while driving than 
those from more modest circumstances.37 
Income-based fines could help reduce the burden of criminal 
justice debt on the poor. Across the country, courts commonly 
levy steep fines on those without the means to pay and then re-
spond to nonpayment with arrests, court proceedings, and peri-
ods of incarceration.38 One result is that a single minor violation, 
like driving with an expired registration, can destabilize the life 
of someone living on the economic margins.39 Another is that 
formerly incarcerated people often face outstanding criminal 
justice debts far in excess of their annual incomes, complicating 
any hope of effective reentry.40 Income-based fines, on the other 
hand, could help ensure that monetary sanctions do not impose 
impossible-to-meet financial obligations on the poor. 
Income-based fines are also more useful, and therefore more 
capable of substituting for other forms of punishment, than fixed 
fines. The core problem is that, when state actors set tariffs, 
minimums, and maximums, they know that whatever they 
choose will apply to offenders across the income spectrum. As a 
consequence, they may be unwilling to set fines high enough to 
reflect the state’s interests—such as deterrence and retribu-
tion41—out of fear that steep fines will unduly penalize poorer 
offenders.42 And because fixed fines undersanction some offenses 
relative to the state’s desire, a resulting lack of confidence in 
fines as a punitive tool may inhibit their use as a substitute for 
other forms of punishment, such as incarceration.43 In Germany, 
where some four out of five of all criminal sanctions are day 
fines, courts regularly use fines as a substitute for incarceration, 
including for relatively serious crimes like assault and fraud.44 
Without proportioning fines to income, however, it is far more 
difficult to set fine levels high enough to satisfactorily substitute 
 
 37 See, for example, Paul K. Piff, et al, Higher Social Class Predicts Increased Un-
ethical Behavior, 109 Proceedings Natl Acad Sci 4086, 4088 (2012). 
 38 See Confronting Criminal Justice Debt at *1–3 (cited in note 13). 
 39 See id at *17. 
 40 See Harris, Evans, and Beckett, 115 Am J Sociology at 1776–85 (cited in note 11). 
 41 Punishment can serve a variety of goals, some of which are in tension. See Frase, 
58 Stan L Rev at 74 (cited in note 34). 
 42 One study of the expected penalties for drunk driving, for example, concluded 
that fines for that offense were on the order of one-fourth of the expected harm. See 
Donald S. Kenkel, Do Drunk Drivers Pay Their Way? A Note on Optimal Penalties for 
Drunk Driving, 12 J Health Econ 137, 145 (1993). 
 43 See Zedlewski, Alternatives to Custodial Supervision at *7 (cited in note 5). 
 44 See Albrecht, Post-adjudication Dispositions at 310 (cited in note 3). 
2018] The Constitutionality of Income-Based Fines 1879 
	
for custodial sanctions like incarceration, at least when serious 
punitive consequences are considered appropriate. 
Depending on how they are designed, income-based fines 
hold the promise of increasing government revenue. Some of this 
increase could come from progressivity at the upper end: in the 
Staten Island experiment, for example, estimates are that reve-
nue from fines would have increased by nearly 80 percent dur-
ing the demonstration project had relatively miserly statutory 
maximums not constrained collection from higher-income  
offenders.45 And even without steep progressivity, income-based 
fines could boost revenue by increasing the rate at which low-
income offenders pay their debts—as fine amounts become more 
manageable, offenders may make greater efforts to complete 
payment.46 
B. Potential Criticism 
Against these benefits, income-based fines are vulnerable to 
a number of objections, from the philosophical to the practical. 
Some will suggest that income-based fines are redistributionist 
policy masquerading as criminal justice reform.47 To be sure, 
economic fairness is, for many, valuable on its own and reason 
enough to scale fines to income.48 But even those unmoved by its 
egalitarian benefits may nonetheless see in income-based fines a 
way to make monetary sanctions more effective in meeting the 
various ends of punishment and more capable of substituting for 
alternative punishments like incarceration. 
Others will argue that a person’s culpability is unrelated to 
her financial means, so scaling punishment according to income 
inappropriately untethers the severity of punishment from 
offender deserts.49 Relatedly, some suggest that allowing income 
to play so important a role in determining the value of a fine 
leads to an “overdimensionalization” of the financial 
circumstances of an offender—that is, too great an emphasis on 
finances relative to other factors that affect whether a 
 
 45 McDonald, Greene, and Worzella, Day Fines in American Courts at *39 (cited in 
note 27). 
 46 See Colgan, 103 Iowa L Rev at 65–67 (cited in note 20). 
 47 See, for example, id at 97–99 (collecting such critiques). 
 48 See, for example, Harris, Evans, and Beckett, 115 Am J Sociology at 1788–91 
(cited in note 11). 
 49 See Frase, 58 Stan L Rev at 73 (cited in note 34) (explaining the purpose theory, 
under which “the severity of the[ ] punishment should be no more and no less than [the 
offender] deserve[s]”). 
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punishment is proportionate to the offense.50 I have already 
mentioned the most significant responses to these concerns: 
(1) in terms of both retribution and deterrence, it is arguably 
more important to equalize how severely punishment is felt than 
it is to achieve nominal uniformity,51 and (2) insofar as the 
concern is that income-based financial sanctions will not reflect 
the appropriate level of severity, fixed fines—because they are 
one-size-fits-all—are themselves deeply imperfect.52 Moreover, a 
system of income-based fines need not ignore traditional 
sentencing factors like the “nature and circumstances of the 
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.”53 
In a day-fine regime, for instance, a court could make an 
individualized and multifactor determination about the number 
of “fine units” a given offense warrants, with the income of the 
offender coming into play only when those fine units are 
converted into the ultimate fine. In this way, an income-based 
fine system could leave the ability of courts to make 
individualized sentencing determinations largely undisturbed. 
Another objection is that income-based fines will sometimes 
overdeter the rich. According to this argument, not all crimes 
are the kind that we want to eliminate entirely, such as mass 
murder. Rather, some rulebreaking results in more benefit to 
society than harm—in law and economics terms, “some criminal 
acts actually are wealth-maximizing”54—and we are happy to 
tolerate noncompliance with the rule if the rulebreaker is will-
ing to pay the price.55 Consider commercial delivery vehicles that 
routinely park illegally and see occasional tickets as the cost of 
doing business. If illegal parking were a capital offense, com-
merce might slow and we all might be worse off.56 From this per-
spective, fixed fines have a valuable purpose: if set at a level 
 
 50 See Albrecht, Post-adjudication Dispositions at 308 (cited in note 3). 
 51 See note 35 and accompanying text. 
 52 See notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
 53 18 USC § 3553(a)(1). 
 54 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 Colum L Rev 
1193, 1205 (1985). 
 55 See A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public En-
forcement of Law, 38 J Econ Lit 45, 48 (2000); Note, Rule Porousness and the Design of 
Legal Directives, 121 Harv L Rev 2134, 2137–40 (2008). 
 56 This is not to suggest that illegal parking is always an insignificant problem or 
that current fines for illegal parking are set to reflect the deleterious impact of that con-
duct on society. From increased congestion to creating street hazards that make streets 
more dangerous, the effects of illegal parking may be considerable. The comparison to 
commercial delivery is drawn from Note, 121 Harv L Rev at 2139 (cited in note 55). 
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that reflects the costs to society of noncompliance, they will de-
ter only undesirable law breaking while allowing those who will 
benefit society by breaking the law to do so.57 Because, however, 
income-based fines reflect not only the costs of rulebreaking but 
the finances of the rulebreaker, fines imposed on the wealthy 
will sometimes exceed those costs and thus deter otherwise de-
sirable behavior—making society, as a whole, worse off.58 It fol-
lows that income-based fines may be less appropriate when soci-
ety can set tariffs at a socially optimal price. 
As with much of the discussion on income-based fines, the 
salience of this critique turns on questions of system design. For 
instance, if an income-based scheme places a ceiling on the 
overall size of monetary penalties, perhaps at a level close to the 
social cost of a given offense, then there is less danger of deter-
ring socially beneficial rulebreaking. This argument also relies 
on an unduly rosy view of the fixed fine. For reasons already 
discussed, it is often difficult to calibrate a fixed fine to reflect 
harms to society when high fines unduly penalize lower-income 
offenders. Likewise, fixed fines are often imposed as punishment 
for crimes that society wants to prohibit full stop—wealth max-
imizing instances be damned.59 More fundamentally, economi-
cally optimal deterrence is not the only end of punishment: as 
the Supreme Court has stated in a related context, “Citizens and 
 
 57 A version of this view is that the state ought to set a fine at a level that forces an 
actor to pay the external costs that his activity imposes on others such that actors will 
still break rules if the utility of doing so exceeds the total cost to society. See, for exam-
ple, Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum L Rev 1523, 1528, 1550 (1984). There 
is, however, no single theory of optimal criminal law enforcement. See generally Nuno 
Garoupa, The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement, 11 J Econ Surveys 267 (1997). 
 58 For the sake of clarity, another example. Assume that the total cost to society of 
parking at a fire hydrant is $1,000—taking everything into account, from the chance 
that a fire will break out; to the damage a fire would do; to the costs of enforcing the fire 
hydrant law, such as traffic cops and towing. A millionaire running late to a meeting 
might gladly pay a fixed fine of $1,000 to park in front of the hydrant—perhaps because 
she will make far more money at the meeting. Under those circumstances, society as a 
whole might be much better off with an illegally parked Rolls Royce. Consider, however, 
if the millionaire faces a day-fine system with no maximum penalty. Because day fines 
scale ever upward with income, the fine on the millionaire could end up far exceeding 
that $1,000 cost to society—so high, potentially, that the millionaire will circle the block. 
 59 For simplicity, this discussion has and, unless otherwise stated, will continue to 
assume that the probability of catching an offender for breaking a rule is constant so 
that the size of a penalty and the reward for successful commission are the primary driv-
ers of a person’s decision whether or not to break the law. If, however, you relax this as-
sumption, then a state could keep the size of a penalty fixed and yet achieve the same 
level of deterrence by increasing apprehension rates. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J Polit Econ 169, 180–81 (1968). 
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legislators may rightly insist that they are willing to tolerate 
some loss in economic efficiency in order to deter what they con-
sider morally offensive conduct, albeit cost-beneficial morally of-
fensive conduct.”60 Those crafting income-based fine regimes will 
ultimately have to balance the various benefits of increasing 
progressivity against the danger of overdeterring the rich. 
A related criticism is that income-based fines will under-
deter the poor. Assuming that the value of successfully commit-
ting a crime—say, stealing a television—is constant, an income-
based scheme will likely lower the expected penalty for poor  
offenders, thereby increasing their incentive to commit certain 
crimes. In fact, because the size of a penalty is directly tied to 
income, the poorer someone is, the greater the incentive to 
commit crime.61 The easiest way to defuse this problem is to set 
minimum fines, although any departure from the principle of in-
come proportionality undermines many of the reasons for adopt-
ing income-based fines in the first place. Perhaps for this reason, 
European day-fine systems tend to have minimum per day 
amounts but set them very low.62 The argument that income-
based fines will fail to deter the poor is something of a twist on 
an old theory: that it is necessary to punish the poor with custo-
dial sanctions rather than financial penalties because, as former 
Judge Richard Posner put it, “Imprisonment . . . imposes disutil-
ity on people who cannot be made miserable enough by having 
their liquid wealth, or even their future wealth, confiscated.”63 
Whatever the truth of that claim, our system is already commit-
ted to the idea that fines are an appropriate penalty for a great 
 
 60 Cooper Industries, Inc v Leatherman Tool Group, Inc, 532 US 424, 439–40 (2001), 
quoting Marc Galanter and David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal 
Pluralism, 42 Am U L Rev 1393, 1450 (1993). 
 61 Consider, for example, someone who expects to earn $10,000 from a successful 
crime. If that person faces a $20,000 fixed fine if caught and thinks the chance of appre-
hension is over 50 percent, then there is no incentive to try the crime, as the expected 
cost (the size of the penalty multiplied by the probability of conviction) exceeds the ex-
pected gain of $10,000. But as the fine decreases, the relative incentive to attempt the 
crime goes up. An example like this one, and an explanation of the problem of under-
deterrence of the poor, appears in Friedman, Comment, 50 U Chi L Rev at 302 (cited in 
note 7). 
 62 See Albrecht, Post-adjudication Dispositions at 311–12 (cited in note 3). 
 63 Posner, 85 Colum L Rev at 1208 (cited in note 54). See also Polinsky and Shavell, 
38 J Econ Lit at 71 (cited in note 55) (positing that imprisonment is used in the case of 
high harm, low probability of detection crimes because their perpetrators “tend to have 
very low assets,” and carceral sanctions are therefore “required to maintain a tolerable 
level of deterrence”). 
2018] The Constitutionality of Income-Based Fines 1883 
	
amount of illegal conduct, and it has long imposed fines on the 
poor despite that regime’s apparent inefficacy.64 
Another objection is that income-based fines could lead to 
discriminatory enforcement against the wealthy—such as local 
police officers targeting drivers in expensive cars for speeding 
tickets. Without a doubt, hunger for government revenue influ-
ences the allocation of law enforcement resources. In places like 
Ferguson, for example, a desire to fill municipal coffers has  
driven aggressive and discriminatory enforcement in low-income 
communities.65 As a result, it isn’t hard to imagine that income-
based fines could incentivize reallocation of enforcement re-
sources toward wealthier communities where new, more fruitful 
revenue opportunities will be available. 
Because, however, those with higher incomes also tend to be 
those with the most political power,66 it may be significantly 
more difficult for governments to target wealthy communities 
for disproportionate enforcement without substantial pushback. 
It is also possible that an increase in the punitive effect of sanc-
tions on those with the most money and political leverage could 
spur efforts to lower the punitive bite of sanctions across the 
board67—a conversation that is sorely absent so long as only the 
poorest (and most politically dispossessed) suffer significant con-
sequences from fines.  
Moreover, the practical likelihood that law enforcement will 
target those with higher incomes should not be overstated. In-
deed, most offenses are not as conducive to discriminatory en-
forcement targeting wealth as motor vehicle offenses. For one, 
the car provides a highly visible proxy for the income of an of-
fender that is absent in other circumstances. For another, law 
enforcement has a freer hand in enforcing less serious offenses 
like speeding, for which an officer’s testimony alone is often  
 
 64 There is even some indication that burdensome criminal justice debt can encour-
age lawbreaking by motivating people to commit crimes as a way to pay it off. See, for 
example, Harris, Evans, and Beckett, 115 Am J Sociology at 1785 (cited in note 11). 
 65 Investigation of Ferguson at *4, 9 (cited in note 2). Of course, as a general matter, 
government should not allocate its law enforcement resources with revenue in mind. But 
few would doubt that a hunger for revenue plays a role in such decisions. 
 66 See Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: 
Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 Perspectives on Polit 564, 566, 573 
(2014) (finding support for the theory that those with the greatest economic resources 
control policymaking). 
 67 See id at 570 (noting that “[p]olicy making is not necessarily a zero-sum game” 
because, “[w]hen one set of actors wins, others may win as well, if their preferences are 
positively correlated with each other”). 
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sufficient to secure a conviction and penalties are low enough 
that most charged with an offense will pay a fine without testing 
the government’s case. For more serious offenses, by contrast, 
the need for corroborating evidence to prove a case, as well as 
the likelihood that the accused will contest a charge, make it 
more difficult for law enforcement to bring cases against 
wealthy offenders out of a desire for revenue—to say nothing of 
the fact that the integrity of law enforcement alone should pre-
vent such unscrupulous conduct. Finally, reforms that would de-
couple local government revenue from local law enforcement—as 
many have already proposed—could greatly reduce any incen-
tive to target wealthy offenders created by income-based fines.68 
Aside from these theoretical considerations, there are prac-
tical challenges to implementing income-based fines. Obviously, 
laws will have to change, beginning with those that specify fixed 
fines and limit fines to a narrow range. Some courts will need 
new capacity to determine the income of offenders, although 
many courts already dedicate significant time and money to in-
vestigating the personal circumstances of offenders in criminal 
cases,69 and it is possible that resources currently dedicated to 
policing the nonpayment of fines could be reallocated if collec-
tion rates increase under the new regime.70 A fuller discussion of 
how to design an income-based system is outside the scope of 
this Article.71 
* * * 
Before turning from the policy implications of income-based 
fines to the next question—whether the federal Constitution is 
any barrier to implementation—three observations are worth 
reemphasizing: First, income-based fines can serve traditional 
goals of punishment, such as retribution and deterrence. Second, 
some of the thorniest issues that arise have to do with treatment 
of those at the very top and bottom of the income distribution. 
Third, minimum and maximum fines, a feature of most  
 
 68 See, for example, Confronting Criminal Justice Debt at *11–12 (cited in note 13) 
(detailing various reforms that might successfully curb revenue-related enforcement dy-
namics in state criminal justice systems). 
 69 In the federal system, for example, probation officers conduct presentence inves-
tigations into, among other things, the “defendant’s history and characteristics, includ-
ing . . . the defendant’s financial condition.” FRCrP 32(d)(2)(A). 
 70 See Colgan, 103 Iowa L Rev at 66–67 (cited in note 20). 
 71 For a detailed discussion about how to design a system of income-based fines, see 
id at 73–101. 
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international day-fine systems, can address many of these same 
problems, though not without a cost to the ends that income-
based fines are meant to achieve. 
III.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INCOME-BASED FINES 
Whatever the practical and philosophical impediments to 
implementing income-based fines in the United States, the 
federal Constitution is unlikely to get in the way. After 
explaining why a range of constitutional doctrines—from the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Sixth 
Amendment jury trial right—pose little obstacle to such a 
system, this Article addresses the Excessive Fines Clause, a 
more substantial challenge. 
A. Various Constitutional Objections 
Other than the Excessive Fines Clause, there is no obvious 
constitutional hurdle to implementing income-based fines. 
As a preliminary matter, substantive constitutional chal-
lenges to punishment—that is, challenges to the method or se-
verity of punishment—run up against a powerful background 
norm of deference to legislative judgment. As Justice Anthony 
Kennedy put it: 
Determinations about the nature and purposes of punish-
ment for criminal acts implicate difficult and enduring 
questions respecting the sanctity of the individual, the na-
ture of law, and the relation between law and the social or-
der. . . . The efficacy of any sentencing system cannot be as-
sessed absent agreement on the purposes and objectives of 
the penal system. And the responsibility for making these 
fundamental choices and implementing them lies with the 
legislature.72 
 In addition to the value-laden nature of punishment,  
Kennedy has emphasized that the Constitution “does not man-
date adoption of any one penological theory.”73 Rather, govern-
ments “have accorded different weights at different times to the 
 
 72 Harmelin v Michigan, 501 US 957, 998 (1991) (Kennedy concurring); see also id 
at 999–1001 (collecting cases). Though Kennedy was discussing the Eighth Amendment 
rather than the Constitution more broadly, the Court has elsewhere emphasized this 
deference norm with respect to other constitutional provisions. See, for example, 
Argersinger v Hamlin, 407 US 25, 38 (1972) (discussing the Sixth Amendment). 
 73 Harmelin, 501 US at 999 (Kennedy concurring). 
1886 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:1869 
	
penological goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation,”74 and the Constitution should not hinder the 
ability of states to tailor sentencing toward those various ends. 
In light of the primary role that the states play in the enforce-
ment of criminal law, the Court has suggested that principles of 
federalism also counsel in favor of deference: “[M]arked diver-
gences both in underlying theories of sentencing and in the 
length of prescribed prison terms are the inevitable, often bene-
ficial, result of the federal structure.”75  
 Finally, the Court has emphasized that judicial review in 
this area runs the risk of becoming a subjective line-drawing 
exercise—few objective factors are available to help decide, for 
example, whether a thirty-year versus twenty-year sentence 
runs afoul of the Constitution.76 This is not to say that the 
Constitution places no substantive limits on the methods or 
severity of sanctions77 but that such challenges face an uphill 
battle. Nevertheless, there are a number of potential 
constitutional arguments—both substantive and procedural—to 
volley at a system of income-based fines. None hold much water. 
1. Equal protection. 
Take, for example, the Equal Protection Clause, which one 
might assume could limit the imposition of penalties that dis-
criminate on the basis of income. Because the prevailing view is 
that socioeconomic status is not a suspect class under that doc-
trine, however, government action that differentiates among 
people based on income is generally subject to only rational ba-
sis review.78 Indeed, government policies that differentiate on 
the basis of income, from progressive taxation to means-testing 
for public benefits, are a staple of American policy. 
 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. See also McCleskey v Zant, 499 US 467, 491 (1991) (“Our federal system 
recognizes the independent power of a State to articulate societal norms through 
criminal law.”). 
 76 See, for example, Harmelin, 501 US at 1000–01 (Kennedy concurring). 
 77 See Part III.B. 
 78 See, for example, Harris v McRae, 448 US 297, 323 (1980) (“[T]his Court has held 
repeatedly that poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification.”); San Antonio 
Independent School District v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 29 (1973) (“[T]his Court has never 
heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking 
strict scrutiny.”). See also Mario L. Barnes and Erwin Chemerinsky, The Disparate 
Treatment of Race and Class in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 72 L & Contemp Probs 
109, 111–14 (2009). 
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Moreover, to the extent the Equal Protection Clause has 
limited punishment along class lines, it has been to require 
courts to take income—specifically, poverty—into account rather 
than to prohibit attention to income.79 Especially relevant here, 
in the criminal context the Supreme Court has ruled that the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits “subject[ing] indigents to in-
carceration simply because of their inability to pay a fine.”80 In 
Williams v Illinois,81 for instance, the Court held that extending 
a maximum prison term on account of an involuntary nonpay-
ment of a fine or court costs is impermissible discrimination un-
der the Equal Protection Clause.82 In Tate v Short,83 the Court 
struck down a statute that limited punishment for a traffic of-
fense to a fine but converted that fine to a prison term for an in-
digent defendant without the means to pay.84 And in Bearden v 
Georgia,85 it held that a court may not revoke a defendant’s pro-
bation for failure to pay a fine and make restitution absent evi-
dence that the defendant was somehow responsible for that fail-
ure—in other words, that nonpayment was “willful[ ]” rather 
than a consequence of an inability to pay—or that alternative 
forms of punishment were inadequate to meet the state’s inter-
ests in punishment and deterrence.86 Although these cases limit 
incarceration for nonpayment of criminal justice debt, the Court 
has suggested that the larger issue of whether fines ought to be 
tailored to income is a question for legislators and sentencing 
courts: 
The Court has not held that fines must be structured to re-
flect each person’s ability to pay in order to avoid dispropor-
tionate burdens. Sentencing judges may, and often do, con-
sider the defendant’s ability to pay, but in such 
circumstances they are guided by sound judicial discretion 
rather than by constitutional mandate.87 
 
 79 See, for example, Rodriguez, 411 US at 20–21. 
 80 Id at 21–22, citing Williams v Illinois, 399 US 235 (1970), and Tate v Short, 401 
US 395 (1971). 
 81 399 US 235 (1970). 
 82 See id at 240–41. 
 83 401 US 395 (1971). 
 84 See id at 397. 
 85 461 US 660 (1983). 
 86 See id at 672–73. 
 87 Rodriguez, 411 US at 22. 
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2. Due process. 
Likewise, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is little barrier to proportioning financial sanctions 
to income. In a line of cases potentially relevant to income-based 
fines, the Court has held that due process places both procedural 
and substantive limitations on the power of states to impose 
punitive damages in civil suits, including prohibitions on 
“grossly excessive” or “arbitrary” damage awards.88 However, the 
Court has separately held that, “[w]here a particular 
Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional 
protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that 
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due 
process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”89 As a 
result, the Eighth Amendment’s express prohibition on excessive 
fines would seem to foreclose an independent due process 
challenge to the excessiveness of a fine. In any event, the 
standard the Court has enunciated for determining whether a 
punitive damages award is “grossly excessive” under the Due 
Process Clause substantially overlaps with the standard it has 
applied under the Excessive Fines Clause.90 While the Court’s 
treatment of punitive damages awards under due process 
doctrine could inform the question whether income-based fines 
run afoul of the Excessive Fines Clause,91 the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is unlikely to impose 
constraints on the magnitude of fines beyond those 
independently required by the Excessive Fines Clause. 
3. The right against self-incrimination. 
Because a system that scales fines to income needs a way to 
assess offender income, some have explored whether the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination could prevent 
courts from gaining access to financial information, such as tax 
records, necessary to determine the appropriate level of an  
 
 88 See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co v Campbell, 538 US 408, 
416 (2003). 
 89 County of Sacramento v Lewis, 523 US 833, 842 (1998) (citations omitted). 
 90 Indeed, the Court has expressly compared this due process standard to the 
test it applies under the Excessive Fines Clause. See Cooper Industries, Inc v 
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc, 532 US 424, 433–35 (2001), citing United States v 
Bajakajian, 524 US 321 (1998). 
 91 See Part III.B. 
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income-based fine.92 It shouldn’t. Broadly speaking, the Fifth 
Amendment does not protect against production of preexisting 
records even if they contain incriminating information.93 Thus, 
the Fifth Amendment rights of a taxpayer are ordinarily not vio-
lated by the enforcement of a summons directing an accountant 
or attorney to produce that taxpayer’s records.94 Moreover, 
American courts routinely gather information about an offend-
er’s financial circumstance as part of the sentencing process. In 
the federal system, for example, probation officers conduct 
presentence investigations that, among other things, provide 
courts with information about “the defendant’s financial condi-
tion” for use in sentencing,95 and federal law expressly provides 
for the disclosure of tax return information to courts for use in 
judicial proceedings.96 
That said, although offenders will rarely be able to shield 
financial records and other documents from court scrutiny, they 
may be able to invoke the right against self-incrimination to 
refuse to answer questions about their income orally or in 
writing.97 Because many day-fine systems have relied primarily 
on self-reporting to determine income, this restraint is 
potentially of some concern. In Germany, for example, courts 
faced with legal limits on access to tax data have administered 
day fines by relying on voluntary disclosures by defendants and 
reports by prosecutors detailing an offender’s occupation, 
education, and residence to determine income.98 As a practical 
 
 92 See, for example, Friedman, Comment, 50 U Chi L Rev at 299–302 (cited in note 7). 
 93 See United States v Hubbell, 530 US 27, 35–36 (2000). Sometimes, however, “the 
act of producing subpoenaed documents . . . might nonetheless have some protected tes-
timonial aspects” that fall within the ambit of Fifth Amendment privilege. Id at 36 n 19, 
citing United States v Doe, 465 US 605, 613 (1984). 
 94 See Fisher v United States, 425 US 391, 397 (1976). 
 95 See FRCrP 32(d)(2)(ii). See also Friedman, Comment, 50 U Chi L Rev at 299–300 
(cited in note 7). 
 96 See 26 USC § 6103(i)(4) (providing for the “[u]se of certain disclosed returns and 
return information in judicial or administrative proceedings”); Criminal Resource Manu-
al § 509 (US Department of Justice, 1997), archived at http://perma.cc/QM53-Y4HZ 
(“[T]ax material may be provided to the court for its use in sentencing pursuant to Rule 
32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”). 
 97 See Fisher, 425 US at 409 (explaining that the Fifth Amendment protects 
against compelled “oral testimony”); Gilbert v California, 388 US 263, 266 (1967) (ex-
plaining that this right extends to compelled written “communications”). 
 98 See Albrecht, Post-adjudication Dispositions at 313–14 (cited in note 3) 
(discussing day-fine systems in countries where courts do not have unrestricted access to 
tax records). German courts are also permitted to estimate a person’s economic 
circumstances in the absence of better information, which both eases the administrative 
burden and may induce offenders to provide the court with accurate information for fear 
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matter, the limited American experience with day fines suggests 
that reliance on self-reporting is similarly workable—with high 
rates of compliance and accuracy in reporting.99 Nevertheless, a 
system that relies primarily on self-reporting would no doubt 
occasionally face the prospect of an offender refusing to 
volunteer information on Fifth Amendment grounds—either 
because providing income information would influence the 
measure of the offender’s liability (that is, the size of a fine)100 or 
because disclosing income could reveal illicit or unreported 
sources of income and thereby subject an offender to further 
liability.101 Because, however, a court faced with such 
intransigence could seek and obtain financial documents 
notwithstanding the Fifth Amendment, there would likely be 
little practical benefit to refusing to cooperate. As a result, there 
is no reason to believe that the self-incrimination right is any 
significant barrier to implementing income-based fines. 
4. The civil-criminal line. 
The difference between civil and criminal adjudication is, as 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist put it mildly, “of some 
constitutional import,”102 and classification of an offense as one 
or the other leads to consequences ranging from the applicable 
burden of proof—reasonable doubt in the criminal context and 
preponderance of the evidence in the typical civil case103—to the 
 
of an overestimate. See id at 314. See also Friedman, Comment, 50 U Chi L Rev at 289–
90 (cited in note 7). 
 99 See Colgan, 103 Iowa L Rev at 63–64 (cited in note 20) (noting that the Staten 
Island, Milwaukee, and Oregon day-fine projects “included verification results, and each 
showed a substantial degree of accuracy”). That said, a system with ready access to of-
fender financial information will obviously avoid the administrative burdens involved in 
trying to determine an offender’s income by other means. 
 100 This is so even if offender income comes into play only at the sentencing phase. 
See Mitchell v United States, 526 US 314, 321 (1999) (explaining that the right against 
self-incrimination applies at sentencing). 
 101 For discussion about how and whether calculation of offender income should in-
clude illicit or unreported income, see Colgan, 103 Iowa L Rev at 93–96. If it were fre-
quently the case that offenders refused to disclose income out of fear that disclosure 
would reveal illicit or unreported sources of income, one possible work-around would be 
for courts and prosecutors to offer “use and derivative use” immunity in connection with 
the volunteered financial information—that is, an agreement that prevents the govern-
ment from using the volunteered information against the witness in a criminal prosecu-
tion. See Kastigar v United States, 406 US 441, 453 (1972). 
 102 United States v Ward, 448 US 242, 248 (1980). 
 103 See Securities and Exchange Commission v C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp, 320 US 
344, 355 (1943). 
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availability of procedural protections that exist only in the 
criminal realm.104 Because fines are so frequently imposed as 
punishment for civil offenses, a move to income proportionality 
that spurred a shift from civil to criminal adjudication could 
prove enormously disruptive. 
The Supreme Court has, however, largely deferred to legis-
lative determinations about whether penalties are civil or crimi-
nal, and the test it employs to second-guess legislative judgment 
suggests that a significant increase in civil penalties imposed on 
the rich is unlikely to force reclassification. As it has explained, 
“[T]he question whether a particular statutorily defined penalty 
is civil or criminal is a matter of statutory construction” focused 
on legislative intent.105 If the statute indicates, either “expressly 
or impliedly,” an intent to establish a civil penalty, then the 
Court asks whether the scheme is “so punitive either in purpose 
or effect as to negate that intention,” and “only the clearest proof 
could suffice to establish the unconstitutionality of a statute on 
such a ground.”106 In determining the punitive purpose or effect 
of a sanction, the Court has considered a number of factors.107 
Importantly, it has expressly rejected overemphasis on the  
degree to which a penalty is “grossly disproportionate to the 
harm caused”108 and suggested that such claims are more appro-
priately addressed by the Excessive Fines Clause.109 In contrast 
to other, nonfinancial penalties, which may be inappropriate in 
the civil setting, it has observed that “the payment of fixed or 
variable sums of money [is a] sanction which ha[s] been  
 
 104 See Ward, 448 US at 248. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id at 248–49, quoting Flemming v Nestor, 363 US 603, 617–21 (1960). 
 107 See Hudson v United States, 522 US 93, 99–100 (1997), quoting Kennedy v  
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144, 168–69 (1963): 
[U]seful guideposts[ ] includ[e]: (1) “[w]hether the sanction involves an affirma-
tive disability or restraint”; (2) “whether it has historically been regarded as a 
punishment”; (3) “whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter”; 
(4) “whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—
retribution and deterrence”; (5) “whether the behavior to which it applies is al-
ready a crime”; (6) “whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally 
be connected is assignable for it”; and (7) “whether it appears excessive in rela-
tion to the alternative purpose assigned.” 
 108 Hudson, 522 US at 101 (overruling United States v Halper, 490 US 435 (1989), 
because it “elevated . . . whether the sanction appeared excessive in relation to its non-
punitive purposes [ ] to dispositive status”). 
 109 Id at 102–03 (“[S]ome of the ills at which Halper was directed are addressed by 
other constitutional provisions. . . . The Eighth Amendment protects against excessive 
civil fines.”). 
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recognized as enforceable by civil proceedings since the original 
revenue law of 1789.”110 Another factor, whether a “sanction 
comes into play ‘only’ on a finding of scienter,”111 also counsels in 
favor of the continued classification of many low-level offenses 
as civil no matter the penalty, as civil offenses like littering and 
parking violations are typically strict-liability offenses. And the 
Court has noted that the use of financial sanctions to promote 
deterrence “is insufficient to render a sanction criminal” even 
though deterrence is a traditional goal of punishment, “as deter-
rence ‘may serve civil as well as criminal goals.’”112 For these 
reasons, a shift to income-based fines is unlikely to turn offenses 
currently classified as civil into criminal ones. 
5. The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial113 poses a more 
noteworthy challenge, but only for regimes that levy hefty finan-
cial sanctions on those at the very top of the income scale. The 
issue is this: fines are often imposed for criminal offenses con-
sidered “petty” as opposed to “serious.” A significant increase in 
the fines that high-income offenders face could potentially turn 
some petty crimes into serious ones. And because the Supreme 
Court has held that the Sixth Amendment jury trial right ap-
plies only to serious criminal prosecutions,114 a reclassification 
from petty to serious could trigger that right where it currently 
doesn’t apply, leading to various complexities in both system de-
sign and administration. 
In determining whether a particular crime is petty or 
serious, courts look chiefly to the “severity of the maximum 
authorized penalty.”115 In this analysis, “[p]rimary emphasis” is 
“placed on the maximum authorized period of incarceration”—
while “[p]enalties such as probation or a fine may engender ‘a 
significant infringement of personal freedom,’ . . . they cannot 
approximate in severity the loss of liberty that a prison term 
entails.”116 Indeed, the Supreme Court has established a 
 
 110 Id at 104, quoting Helvering v Mitchell, 303 US 391, 400 (1938). 
 111 Hudson, 522 US at 104. 
 112 Id at 105, quoting United States v Ursery, 518 US 267, 292 (1996). 
 113 The Sixth Amendment reads, in relevant part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to . . . an impartial jury.” US Const Amend VI. 
 114 Blanton v City of North Las Vegas, 489 US 538, 541–42 (1989). 
 115 Id at 541, quoting Baldwin v New York, 399 US 66, 68 (1970). 
 116 Blanton, 489 US at 542, quoting Frank v United States, 395 US 147, 151 (1969). 
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rebuttable presumption that offenses punishable by six months’ 
imprisonment or less are petty,117 which a defendant may 
overcome “only if he can demonstrate that any additional 
statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum 
authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they 
clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense in 
question is a ‘serious’ one.”118 And it has remarked more than 
once that it will be a “rare situation where a legislature packs 
an offense it deems ‘serious’ with onerous penalties that 
nonetheless do not puncture the 6-month incarceration line.”119 
In Southern Union Co v United States,120 however, the Court 
made clear that fines can rise high enough to trigger the jury 
trial right even when incarceration isn’t on the table.121 Explain-
ing that “not all fines are insubstantial, and not all offenses pun-
ishable by fines are petty,” the Court suggested that the defend-
ant was “properly accorded a jury trial” under the Sixth 
Amendment given that the charges at issue carried a maximum 
fine of $50,000 for each day of a violation, culminating in a max-
imum potential fine of $38.1 million.122 To make its point, the 
Court cited an illustrative sample of “substantial” fines: a crimi-
nal contempt fine of $52 million, a $400 million fine for a viola-
tion of the Sherman Antitrust Act, a fine of $448.5 million for 
two violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and a fine of 
$1.195 billion for violations of food and drug laws.123 If these eye-
popping totals are any guide, then an eight-figure fine is likely 
high enough to trigger the Sixth Amendment right. At the other 
end of the equation, the Court has sanctioned petty crimes with 
maximum authorized fines of $10,000 in 1975124 (roughly 
 
 117 See Blanton, 489 US at 543. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id at 543 (quotation marks omitted). See also United States v Nachtigal, 507 US 1, 
5 (1993) (finding that a maximum fine of $5,000 did not render a DUI offense “serious”). 
 120 567 US 343 (2012). 
 121 Id at 351.  
 122 Id at 347, 351–52. 
 123 See id at 351. 
 124 See Muniz v Hoffman, 422 US 454, 477 (1975). This and the following inflation 
adjustments were calculated using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price Index 
Inflation Calculator and are accurate as of February 2018. CPI Inflation Calculator  
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, Apr 2018), online at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (vis-
ited May 8, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable). The fact that the Muniz Court allowed a 
petty offense to carry a fine close to $50,000 in today’s dollars could suggest that the 
Southern Union Court viewed the aggregate $38.1 million dollar fine, rather than the 
$50,000 per day penalty, as the reason why that financial sanction was too high to es-
cape the Sixth Amendment jury trial right. 
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$47,000 adjusted for inflation), $1,000 in 1989125 (roughly $2,000 
today), and $4,000 in 1993126 (roughly $7,000 today). 
The Court is unlikely to adopt a strict numerical rule gov-
erning when a fine makes a crime serious for Sixth Amendment 
purposes, but even a conservative reading of these cases sug-
gests that an income-based fine regime could punish offenses 
with fines well into the tens-of-thousands of dollars range with-
out triggering the jury trial right. In other words, only a  
Finland-like system with no ceiling on the overall size of fines 
would risk transforming petty crimes into serious ones.127 More-
over, this discussion has so far assumed that the absolute size of 
the fine is the appropriate measure, but the Court has on occa-
sion suggested that it is the relative burden that a fine would 
impose that matters for Sixth Amendment purposes.128 
 
 125 See Blanton, 489 US at 544–45. 
 126 See Nachtigal, 507 US at 5. 
 127 An additional wrinkle: courts look to the “maximum authorized penalty” when 
deciding whether an offense is petty or serious. Blanton, 489 US at 541. How would that 
general rule apply when an income-based fine regime authorized stiff maximum penal-
ties for petty offenses but specified that such fines would apply only to wealthy offend-
ers? In other words, if an income-based fine specifies a maximum authorized sanction of 
$1 million but also that such a fine applies only if an offender is a billionaire, does that 
make an offense that would otherwise be petty for low-income offenders become a serious 
one for all offenders, including poor offenders who face no real threat of that maximum 
penalty being imposed? If so, then implementing a system of income-based fines that in-
cluded high penalties on the wealthy for otherwise petty offense would more extensively 
disrupt the current practice of petty offense adjudication. One way to defuse this  
potential problem is to have factfinding or stipulations about an offender’s income level 
at the initial stages of a criminal prosecution so that a court can determine whether an 
offender will, if convicted, face a penalty high enough to be “serious”; in practice, only 
wealthy offenders will. Another solution is to remove the maximum authorized penalty 
altogether, as in a Finland-style day-fine regime. This is because, when a statute fails to 
specify a maximum penalty, courts look to the penalty actually imposed to determine 
whether the jury right should have attached. See Frank, 395 US at 149. The practical 
result would be that otherwise petty offenses would become serious only for high-income 
offenders, as these are the only offenders who will have constitutionally serious fines im-
posed at sentencing. Put together, a “low max” system (with penalties in the tens of 
thousands) and a “no max” system (of Finland-style day fines) might both be easier to 
implement than a “high max” system (one that authorized penalties in the tens of mil-
lions), at least when the trial right and petty offenses are concerned. 
 128 See Muniz, 422 US at 477: 
It is not difficult to grasp the proposition that six months in jail is a serious 
matter for any individual, but it is not tenable to argue that the possibility of a 
$501 fine would be considered a serious risk to a large corporation or labor  
union. . . . [W]e cannot say that the fine of $10,000 imposed on Local 70 in this 
case was a deprivation of such magnitude that a jury should have been inter-
posed to guard against bias or mistake. This union . . . collects dues from some 
13,000 persons. 
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Even if steep fines could trigger the jury trial right, the re-
sults would hardly counsel against scaling fines to income. First, 
as this Section discusses, fines are frequently imposed as pun-
ishment for crimes deemed serious because they carry long peri-
ods of incarceration, meaning that for these offenses the jury 
trial right has already attached. As for crimes that would be-
come serious under an income-based fine regime, expansion of 
the jury right would lead to some increase in the number of jury 
trials, along with their associated costs and burdens, but that ef-
fect would likely be small:129 after all, even if the jury trial is 
available, “the reality [is] that criminal justice today is for the 
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”130 Finally, 
under Apprendi v New Jersey,131 when the Sixth Amendment  
jury right attaches, the accused possesses an attendant right to 
have every fact “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction . . . 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum . . . submitted to a jury, and proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”132 Accordingly, under an income-based fine 
scheme in which the maximum penalty varied according to in-
come, an offender’s income could become a jury question.133 By 
contrast, without any maximum penalty, a judge could deter-
mine an offender’s income along with the amount of a financial 
sanction at sentencing.134 While the design of an income-based 
fine regime will have to take these considerations into account, 
they are hardly insurmountable. 
 
(emphasis added). See also Southern Union, 567 US at 351 (distinguishing between fines 
imposed on “organizational defendants” and those imposed on “an individual” and citing 
18 USC § 3572(a)(2), which requires a court to consider “the burden that the fine will 
impose upon the defendant” in determining whether to impose a fine and in what 
amount). 
 129 Moreover, only high-income offenders would likely receive jury trial rights where 
they currently have none. See note 127. 
 130 Lafler v Cooper, 566 US 156, 170 (2012) (noting that “[n]inety-seven percent of 
federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty 
pleas”). 
 131 530 US 466 (2000). 
 132 Southern Union, 567 US at 348, quoting Apprendi, 530 US at 490. 
 133 This is not without its perils: as the Court has recognized, “presentation of evi-
dence of a defendant’s net worth creates the potential that juries will use their verdicts 
to express biases against big businesses,” State Farm, 538 US at 417 (2003), and pre-
sumably the same danger exists for wealthy individuals. 
 134 See Southern Union, 567 US at 353 (“Nor . . . could there be an Apprendi viola-
tion where no maximum is prescribed.”). 
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B. The Excessive Fines Clause 
According to United States v Bajakajian135—the only deci-
sion in which the Supreme Court has struck down a fine as  
excessive—a fine violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is 
“grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s of-
fense.”136 Whether this clause limits the ability of governments 
to impose weighty fines on the rich primarily turns on the mean-
ing of disproportionality: A fine must be proportional, but pro-
portional in what sense?137 
On the one hand, income-based fines are by definition pro-
portional: as the size of a monetary penalty rises or falls in pro-
portion to a person’s income, offenders experience similar re-
tributive consequences and deterrent effects. And insofar as a 
proportional punishment is one tailored to serve the ends of 
punishment as opposed to one that is unnecessary or gratuitous 
when measured against its purposes, income-based fines are 
proportional insofar as they improve the ability of financial 
sanctions to meet important goals of punishment, such as retri-
bution and deterrence. On the other hand, the Excessive Fines 
Clause could constrain income-based fines if it requires an  
income-blind assessment of proportionality or if proportionality 
is understood as a strict relationship between the gravity of the 
offense and the absolute—as opposed to relative—severity of a 
punishment. To explore which view of proportionality might 
prevail and other implications of this doctrine for income-based 
fines, what follows is a review of the Supreme Court’s Excessive 
Fines Clause jurisprudence, a survey of cases in state and lower 
federal courts, and a discussion of the Court’s larger “gross dis-
proportionality” and due process case law.138 
 
 135 524 US 321 (1998). 
 136 Id at 334. 
 137 The framing of this question, and the following discussion about various strains of 
proportionality, is deeply informed by the work of Professor Richard Frase. See, for exam-
ple, Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth 
Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 Minn L Rev 571, 588–97 (2005). 
 138 For the purposes of this Article, I do not dwell on the question of whether the 
doctrine surrounding the Excessive Bail Clause can offer any insight on the constitu-
tionality of income-based fines. The Court’s Excessive Fines Clause cases have largely 
ignored the Excessive Bail Clause, in part because, unlike the other two provisions of the 
Eighth Amendment, the Bail Clause is not concerned with punishment. See Austin v 
United States, 509 US 602, 609 (1993). The Excessive Bail Clause requires an individual-
ized bail determination, with bail set no higher “than an amount reasonably calculated” 
to assure the presence of the accused, taking into account, among other factors, the fi-
nancial circumstances of the defendant. Stack v Boyle, 342 US 1, 5 (1951). On this 
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Ultimately, the Excessive Fines Clause should not prevent 
government efforts to scale financial sanctions to income. As 
with the constitutional objections already discussed, this clause 
is not an obstacle to a scheme that would reduce the burden of 
financial sanctions on those without means—if anything, it may 
prohibit the imposition of overly burdensome fines on the poor. 
At the other end of the income spectrum, the Excessive Fines 
Clause could place an upper limit on financial sanctions levied 
on the rich, especially for low-level offenses. But that result is 
uncertain and, if international examples are any guide, unlikely 
to dramatically affect the design of a US system, as most day-
fine regimes include caps on the size of fines for reasons wholly 
apart from any constitutional constraints. 
1. Excessive fines in the Supreme Court. 
The Eight Amendment reads: “Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”139 While the Supreme Court had long 
grappled with the meaning of “cruel and unusual punishment”140 
and the prohibition on “excessive bail,”141 it took until 1989 for it 
to consider an application of the Excessive Fines Clause.142 A  
series of four cases followed, culminating in Bajakajian. 
 
ground, one might argue by analogy that interpreting the Excessive Fines Clause to re-
quire an income-blind assessment of excessiveness would be inappropriate. But as the 
following Sections discuss, there are firmer doctrinal bases for that conclusion. 
 139 US Const Amend VIII. 
 140 See, for example, Wilkerson v Utah, 99 US 130, 134–35 (1878) (upholding a sen-
tence of death by firing squad). 
 141 See, for example, Stack, 342 US at 5–6 (holding excessive bail that was set high-
er than an amount reasonably calculated to assure that the accused will stand trial and 
submit to sentence if found guilty). 
 142 See Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc v Kelco Disposal, Inc, 492 US 
257, 262 (1989) (“[T]his Court has never considered an application of the Excessive Fines 
Clause.”). Otherwise, there is “[e]ssentially no Supreme Court Excessive Fines Clause 
case law . . . prior to the modern era.” McLean, 40 Hastings Const L Q at 870 (cited in 
note 7). In Ex parte Watkins, 32 US 568 (1833), the Court declined to hear an excessive 
fines challenge on jurisdictional grounds but went on, in dicta, to remark that “there is 
nothing on the record in this case, which establishes that at the time of passing judg-
ment the present fines were in fact, or were shown to the circuit court to be excessive.” Id 
at 574. Similarly, in 1846, a litigant before the Court apparently argued that a criminal 
fine was “an excessive fine, and a consequent cruel and unusual punishment,” as “[t]he 
law never imposes a fine, where it presumes the party can have nothing to pay”; but the 
Court denied this and other claims without comment. Spalding v New York, 45 US 21, 
30, 36 (1846). Perhaps the fullest discussion prior to the modern era occurred in Pervear 
v Massachusetts, 72 US 475 (1866), in which the Court considered whether a fine of “fifty 
dollars” and a sentence of “imprisonment at hard labor . . . for three months” imposed as 
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First, in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc v Kelco 
Disposal, Inc,143 the Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause 
constrains only fines “directly imposed by, and payable to, the 
government.”144 As it explained, “At the time of the drafting and 
ratification of the Amendment, the word ‘fine’ was understood to 
mean a payment to a sovereign as punishment for some of-
fense.”145 And although there is little direct evidence of the 
Founders’ intent in crafting the clause, its language draws near-
verbatim from a provision of the English Bill of Rights of 1689146 
that was itself targeted at curbing government excess—in par-
ticular, a practice in which the king’s judges would impose 
heavy fines on political opponents and allow those who could not 
pay to languish in jail.147 In keeping with that history, the Court 
rejected any notion that the clause constrains the size of puni-
tive damages awards in civil cases between private parties.148 
Next, in Austin v United States,149 the Court determined 
that the clause “limits the government’s power to extract 
payments . . . as punishment” whether or not a proceeding is 
considered civil or criminal.150 “The notion of punishment,” it 
explained, “cuts across the division between the civil and the 
criminal law.”151 As such, “a civil sanction that cannot fairly be 
said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be 
explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent 
 
punishment for unlicensed liquor sales was “excessive, cruel, and unusual” but rejected 
the challenge on the ground that—as was the case prior to ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment—the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the states. Id at 480. In dicta, 
however, the Court stated that it perceived “nothing excessive, or cruel, or unusual” in 
the punishment, as “[t]he object of the law was to protect the community against the 
manifold evils of intemperance,” and prohibiting unlicensed liquor sales “under penal-
ties” was “the usual mode adopted in many, perhaps, all of the States” and “wholly  
within the discretion of State legislatures.” Id. 
 143 492 US 257 (1989). 
 144 Id at 268. 
 145 Id at 265 (emphasis added). On this point and others, Professor Beth A. Colgan 
has been sharply critical of the Court’s historical analysis. See, for example, Colgan, 102 
Cal L Rev at 300 (cited in note 7). 
 146 Browning-Ferris, 492 US at 266–67. The English Bill of Rights of 1689 read, in 
relevant part: “[E]xcessive Baile ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed 
nor cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted.” English Bill of Rights, 1 Wm & Mary, 
sess 2, ch 2 (1689), in 6 Statutes of the Realm 142, 143. 
 147 Browning-Ferris, 492 US at 267. 
 148 Id at 275–76. 
 149 509 US 602 (1993). 
 150 Id at 609–10. 
 151 Id at 610, quoting Halper, 490 US at 447–48. 
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purposes, is punishment” within the clause’s purview.152 
Applying these principles, the Court determined that a civil 
action in which the government sought forfeiture of property 
connected to drug trafficking was subject to the clause’s 
limitations given that the purpose of such a forfeiture was, at 
least in part, punitive.153 In Alexander v United States,154 a 
companion case issued the same day, the Court held that a 
criminal forfeiture, levied atop a six-year prison term and 
$100,000 fine, was similarly challengeable—“no different, for 
Eighth Amendment purposes, from a traditional ‘fine.’”155 
While those cases concerned what constitutes a fine,  
Bajakajian marks the first time the Court has spelled out the 
standard for determining whether a fine is excessive. In it, a 
man attempted to board a plane leaving the United States with-
out reporting, as required by federal law, that he was transport-
ing more than $10,000 in cash.156 Pursuant to another law that 
made “any property . . . involved in such offense”157 subject to 
forfeiture, the Government sought all $357,144 that the man 
failed to declare.158 Following the trio of cases just discussed, the 
Court had “little trouble concluding” that the forfeiture was 
“punishment,” and thus a “fine” within the meaning of the 
clause, given that it was imposed following a criminal conviction 
and, as the Government argued, served the state’s interest in 
deterring the illicit movement of cash—deterrence being a “tra-
ditional[ ] . . . goal of punishment.”159 
Turning to whether the fine was constitutionally “exces-
sive,” the Court noted that the “touchstone” of that inquiry “is 
the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture 
must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it 
is designed to punish.”160 Yet as Justice Clarence Thomas re-
marked in his opinion for the majority, “The text and history of 
the Excessive Fines Clause . . . provide little guidance as to how 
disproportional a punitive forfeiture must be to the gravity of an 
 
 152 Austin, 509 US at 610, quoting Halper, 490 US at 448. 
 153 See Austin, 509 US at 621–22. 
 154 509 US 544 (1993). 
 155 Id at 558. 
 156 Bajakajian, 524 US at 324. 
 157 Id, quoting 18 USC § 982(a)(1). 
 158 Bajakajian, 524 US at 324. 
 159 Id at 328–29. 
 160 Id at 334. 
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offense in order to be ‘excessive.’”161 Contemporary dictionaries 
defined “excessive” as “surpassing the usual, the proper, or a 
normal measure of proportion”162—little help on the specifics. As 
to history, the Court recounted the legacy of the English Bill of 
Rights of 1689, as well as Magna Carta’s limits on “amerce-
ments (the medieval predecessors of fines),” which required that 
such penalties “be proportioned to the offense and that they 
should not deprive a wrongdoer of his livelihood,”163 but the 
Court found scarcely anything to suggest “how disproportional 
to the gravity of an offense a fine must be in order to be deemed 
constitutionally excessive.”164 
Left wanting by text and history, the Court adopted a century- 
old standard165 from its Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
jurisprudence: gross disproportionality. This clause, the Court 
has explained, though by its terms addressing “cruel and un-
usual punishments,” “prohibits not only barbaric punishments, 
but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime com-
mitted.”166 Because, however, “judgments about the appropriate 
punishment for an offense belong in the first instance to the leg-
islature” and “judicial determination regarding the gravity of a 
particular criminal offense [is] inherently imprecise,” the Court 
has largely deferred to legislative judgment in this area, policing 
only punishments that are grossly disproportionate.167 
 
 161 Id at 335. 
 162 Bajakajian, 524 US at 335, citing Noah Webster, 1 An American Dictionary of 
the English Language, excessive (Converse 1828) (defining excessive as “beyond the 
common measure or proportion”), and Samuel Johnson, 1 A Dictionary of the English 
Language, excessive (Strahan 4th ed 1773) (defining excessive as “[b]eyond the common 
proportion”). 
 163 Bajakajian, 524 US at 335–36, citing Magna Carta Art 14:  
A Free-man shall not be amerced for a small fault, but after the manner of the 
fault; and for a great fault after the greatness thereof, saving to him his con-
tenement; [ ] and a Merchant likewise, saving to him his merchandise; [ ] and 
any other’s villain than ours shall be likewise amerced, saving his wainage. 
 164 Bajakajian, 524 US at 336. 
 165 Thomas, writing for the Bajakajian majority, relied on Solem v Helm, 463 US 
277 (1983), and Rummel v Estelle, 445 US 263 (1980), both of which drew on the propor-
tionality analysis of Weems v United States, 217 US 349, 368 (1910). 
 166 Solem, 463 US at 284. 
 167 Bajakajian, 524 US at 336. Some commentators have criticized the Court for im-
porting the proportionality limitations of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
into the Excessive Fines Clause. See, for example, Barry L. Johnson, Purging the Cruel 
and Unusual: The Autonomous Excessive Fines Clause and Desert-Based Constitutional 
Limits on Forfeiture after United States v. Bajakajian, 2000 U Ill L Rev 461, 506 (argu-
ing that the Excessive Fines Clause contains a more robust proportionality requirement 
than the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause). 
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Thus, under Bajakajian, a fine “violates the Excessive Fines 
Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defend-
ant’s offense.”168 Although the Court did not spell it out in pre-
cisely these terms, this inquiry can be divided into three parts: 
(1) the gravity of an offense, (2) the magnitude of a fine, and 
(3) proportionality. 
The Court discussed gravity in terms of culpability and 
harm. As to culpability, the Court first observed that the “es-
sence” of the defendant’s crime was a “willful failure to report 
the removal of currency from the United States”—a relatively 
unserious “reporting offense.”169 Then the Court took an individ-
ualized look at the defendant’s conduct, noting that his “viola-
tion was unrelated to any other illegal activities” given that 
“[t]he money was the proceeds of legal activity and was to be 
used to repay a lawful debt.”170 As a consequence, Bajakajian 
himself did “not fit into the class of persons for whom the statute 
was principally designed: He [was] not a money launderer, a 
drug trafficker, or a tax evader.”171 Particular emphasis was 
placed on the “other penalties that the Legislature ha[d] author-
ized” for the crime, which the Court took as “relevant evidence” 
of the “offense’s gravity.”172 Specifically, the Court took the fact 
that, “under the Sentencing Guidelines, . . . the maximum sen-
tence that could have been imposed on [Bajakajian] was six 
months, while the maximum fine was $5,000” as confirmation of 
the defendant’s “minimal level of culpability.”173 
As to harm, the Court adopted a similarly narrow view, de-
fining it in terms of the consequences of the defendant’s individ-
ual conduct, injury to the government as opposed to the public, 
and injury caused by the failure to report irrespective of the 
amount unreported. As it explained, 
 
 168 Bajakajian, 524 US at 334. 
 169 Id at 337. 
 170 Id at 338. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Bajakajian, 524 US at 339 n 14. 
 173 Id at 338–39. The Court’s reliance on the Sentencing Guidelines was somewhat 
curious. As the dissent stressed, Congress authorized a maximum fine of $250,000 plus 
five years’ imprisonment for the statutory violation, and the Guidelines separately per-
mitted a “forfeiture if mandated by statute.” Id at 339 n 14. In the majority’s view, that 
the Guideline sentence was “but a fraction of the penalties authorized . . . show[ed] that 
[defendant’s] culpability relative to other potential violators of the reporting provision 
. . . [was] small indeed.” Id. 
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[The] [f]ailure to report his currency affected only one party, 
the Government, and in a relatively minor way. There was 
no fraud on the United States, and . . . no loss to the public 
fisc. Had his crime gone undetected, the Government would 
have been deprived only of the information that $357,144 
had left the country.174 
Rejecting the Government’s argument that the harm it suffers 
increases along with the amount of money leaving the country 
unreported, the Court again made reference to the defendant’s 
own conduct: “It is impossible to conclude . . . that the harm [de-
fendant] caused” by moving $357,144 “is anywhere near 30 
times greater than that caused by a hypothetical drug dealer 
who willfully fails to report taking $12,000 out of the country in 
order to purchase drugs.”175 
Moving from the gravity of the offense to the magnitude of 
the fine, the Court concluded only that “full forfeiture of [the de-
fendant’s] $357,144” violated the Excessive Fines Clause, declin-
ing to speculate as to how high the forfeiture could have gone 
without running afoul of the Constitution.176 
As to the meaning of proportionality, the Court gave even 
fewer clues. The majority seemed concerned with what degree of 
disproportionality the Constitution should tolerate,177 but the 
more basic question of what proportionality is went, at least on 
the surface, unexamined. The forfeiture, the Court noted, was 
“larger than the $5,000 fine” authorized by the Guidelines—
indeed, it was some sixty-five times greater.178 This focus could 
suggest that the Court thought of proportionality as a mathe-
matical ratio: a fine may be only so many multiples of the  
gravity of an offense. The Court also remarked that full forfei-
ture was excessive because it bore “no articulable correlation to 
any injury suffered by the Government,”179 perhaps suggesting 
that if the government had explained why the forfeiture served 
 
 174 Id at 339 (emphasis added). 
 175 Id. The majority’s answer here is something of a non sequitur: whether the gov-
ernment’s interest in preventing unreported movement of money increases along with 
the amount is a separate question from whether the movement of licit money causes less 
harm than the movement of illicit money. 
 176 Bajakajian, 524 US at 337 n 11. 
 177 See id at 335 (“[T]he Clause’s text and history provide little guidance as to how 
disproportional a punitive forfeiture must be to gravity of an offense in order to be ‘ex-
cessive.’”) (emphasis added). 
 178 Id at 340. 
 179 Id. 
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important state interests—in other words, that there was a cor-
relation between the sanction imposed and the gravity of the of-
fense—the result might have been different. This points toward 
a view of proportionality as requiring that sanctions further the 
ends of punishment as opposed to being unnecessary or gratui-
tous when measured against the purposes of punishment. 
More telling, perhaps, than what the Court said is what it 
left unaddressed. Specifically, it failed to engage with an argu-
ment raised by the government and the dissent: that forfeiture 
of the full amount served the state’s interest in deterrence.180 As 
Kennedy argued in the dissent, Congress authorized full forfei-
ture of all undeclared cash in order “to deter lucrative money 
laundering”—without full forfeiture, the consequence of moving 
undeclared cash becomes a “modest cost of doing business in the 
world of drugs and crime.”181 Because the majority instead fixed 
on the individual blameworthiness of the defendant and the 
harm resulting from his actions, without reference to the gov-
ernment’s interest in setting a financial sanction necessary to 
deter such conduct, many commentators have suggested that 
Bajakajian adopts a view of “retributive proportionality” 
grounded in the “traditional elements of blameworthiness”: 
harm and culpability.182 Under this view, “[I]t is wrong to punish 
an individual to a greater degree than offense seriousness would 
dictate, even if such disproportionate punishment generates sig-
nificant social gain.”183 By contrast, under a nonretributive or 
utilitarian model of proportionality, in which interests such as 
deterrence are recognized as legitimate bases for punishment, a 
fine high enough to “deter future violations, rather than simply 
to compensate the government for the injury caused by the  
 
 180 The majority directly discusses the state’s interest in deterrence only in the con-
text of concluding that the forfeiture was a “fine” for the purposes of the Excessive Fines 
Clause. As it noted, the fact that the forfeiture could serve the interest of deterrence does 
not mean that the forfeiture did not constitute “punishment” because “deterrence . . . has 
traditionally been viewed as a goal of punishment.” Bajakajian, 524 US at 329. 
 181 Id at 350, 354 (Kennedy dissenting). The dissent also took a more categorical—
that is, less individualized—view of the offense in question, focusing not on the defend-
ant’s relative blamelessness but on the role that reporting violations writ large play in 
the world of international criminal enterprise. See id at 351. 
 182 Frase, 89 Minn L Rev at 602, 623 n 236 (cited in note 137). See also, for example, 
Johnson, 2000 U Ill L Rev at 493–95 (cited in note 167). 
 183 Johnson, 2000 U Ill L Rev at 494 (cited in note 167). 
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defendant” would be appropriate despite being “some multiplier 
of the actual harm caused.”184 
As I allude to above, because culpability and harm will  
rarely vary with income,185 the constitutionality of income-based 
fines under the standard announced in Bajakajian largely turns 
on the definition of proportionality. Under nonretributive pro-
portionality, weighty income-based fines imposed on the rich 
could be justified as improving the ability of financial sanctions 
to deter wealthy offenders. From the perspective of retributive 
proportionality, income-based fines could still be justified on a 
theory of subjective retribution: increased fines on the rich are 
necessary to ensure that fines have an adequate retributive 
“bite”—in other words, that wealthy offenders experience finan-
cial sanctions as sufficiently punitive. But if proportionality is 
understood as mandating a strict relationship between the  
gravity of the offense and the absolute, as opposed to relative, 
severity of a punishment, or if the Excessive Fines Clause re-
quires an income-blind assessment of proportionality, then  
income-based fines will be significantly constrained. 
On that last point, Bajakajian expressly reserved the ques-
tion whether “wealth or income are relevant to the proportional-
ity determination” or whether the fact that a fine will “deprive 
[an offender] of his livelihood” is relevant to the constitutional 
analysis.186 But that is not the only statement on the matter 
from the Supreme Court. Rather, writing for herself and Justice 
John Paul Stevens in Browning-Ferris, Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor concluded that the Excessive Fines Clause does not 
bar a state from taking the wealth of an offender into account 
when setting a punishment: 
Using economic analysis, some of the amici in support of 
[the defendant] argue that the wealth of a defendant should 
not, as a constitutional matter, be taken into account in set-
ting the amount of an award of punitive damages. It seems 
to me that this argument fails because the Excessive Fines 
Clause is only a substantive ceiling on the amount of a 
monetary sanction,187 and not an economic primer on what 
 
 184 Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking the Lines”: The Due Process Clause, Punitive Dam-
ages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 Minn L Rev 880, 902 (2004). 
 185 See text accompanying notes 50–53. 
 186 Bajakajian, 524 US at 340 n 15. 
 187 How to reconcile O’Connor’s statement that the Excessive Fines Clause is a “sub-
stantive ceiling on the amount of a monetary sanction” given that the rest of this passage 
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factors best further the goals of punishment and deterrence. 
Just as the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Herbert 
Spencer’s Social Statics, . . . the Eighth Amendment does 
not incorporate the views of the Law and Economics School. 
The “Constitution does not require the States to subscribe to 
any particular economic theory.” . . . Moreover, as a histori-
cal matter, the argument is weak indeed. First, Magna  
Carta only required that an amercement be proportionate 
and not destroy a person’s livelihood. Second, Blackstone 
remarked that the “quantum, in particular, of pecuniary 
fines neither can, nor ought to be, ascertained by any invar-
iable law. The value of money itself changes from a thou-
sand causes; and at all events, what is ruin to one man’s 
fortune, may be a matter of indifference to another’s.”188 
Especially notable for our purposes, O’Connor endorsed the 
view that a state could increase the nominal size of a penalty in 
response to a defendant’s wealth rather than addressing  
whether the Excessive Fines Clause requires the reduction of 
penalties on the poor.189 Her position rested on two pillars: first, 
that “[r]eviewing courts . . . should grant substantial deference 
to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in 
determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes,” es-
pecially when a challenge to that legislative judgment would re-
quire imposing a single penological—or economic—theory on the 
state;190 and second, the historical foundations of the Excessive 
Fines Clause—the proportionality and deprivation of livelihood 
principles in Magna Carta, both of which were acknowledged by 
 
suggests that a fine may be proportioned to income? Perhaps she was endorsing the view 
that, while a state may take income into account, it may only go so far in doing so. See 
text accompanying notes 255–56. 
 188 Browning-Ferris, 492 US at 300 (O’Connor concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (citations omitted). The majority in Browning-Ferris concluded that the Excessive 
Fines Clause does not apply to punitive damages awards in cases between private par-
ties, but O’Connor disagreed, which is why she proceeded to sketch out the appropriate 
standard for determining whether that award was excessive within the meaning of the 
Eighth Amendment. Interestingly, even one of the amici to which O’Connor referred con-
ceded in its brief that “[i]f an individual is held liable for his or her own wrongful con-
duct, there is a basis for taking the individual’s wealth into account in setting a punitive 
damages award” but argued that taking into account the wealth of a corporation was an-
other matter. Brief for Navistar International Transportation Corp as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc v Kelco Disposal, Inc, 
No 88-556, *7, 14–15 (US filed Jan 19, 1989). 
 189 Browning-Ferris, 492 US at 300–01. 
 190 Helm, 463 US at 290. 
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the Court in Bajakajian,191 as well as Blackstone’s recognition of 
the subjectivity of financial sanctions.192 Although she did not 
speak for the Court, O’Connor’s statement in Browning-Ferris is 
perhaps the firmest doctrinal foothold for a party arguing in fa-
vor of the constitutionality of weighty income-based fines. That 
said, her view that a state may take income into account is far 
from a requirement that it do so, nor is it irreconcilable, strictly 
speaking, with the Constitution setting some retributive upper 
limit restricting how high a state may set a sanction in relation 
to the gravity of an offense. 
Having exhausted the Supreme Court’s own Excessive Fines 
Clause jurisprudence,193 I now turn to how other courts have in-
terpreted that provision in the wake of Bajakajian. 
2. Excessive fines in lower courts. 
To say that the lower courts are confused about how to ap-
ply Bajakajian is an understatement. As one scholar has re-
marked, “[T]he doctrine has created a quagmire.”194 The DC  
Circuit has, characteristically, put it more mildly: Bajakajian’s 
gross disproportionality analysis “hardly establish[es] a discrete 
 
 191 See Bajakajian, 524 US at 335–36. 
 192 A fuller version of the Blackstone commentary contains both a recognition of the 
inherent relativity of financial sanctions and an evocative example of how fixed fines can 
inadequately deter the wealthy:  
The quantum, in particular, of pecuniary fines neither can, nor ought to be, as-
certained by any invariable law. The value of money itself changes from a 
thousand causes; and, at all events, what is ruin to one man’s fortune, may be 
matter of indifference, to another’s. Thus the law of the twelve tables at Rome 
fined every person, that struck another, five and twenty denarii: this, in the 
more opulent days of the empire, grew to be a punishment of so little consider-
ation, that Aulus Gellius tells a story of one Lucius Neratius, who made it his 
diversion to give a blow to whomever he pleased, and then tender them the le-
gal forfeiture. 
William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England 371–72 (Clarendon 1769). 
 193 The Supreme Court has mentioned the Excessive Fines Clause in cases since 
Bajakajian but mostly in passing. Its most lengthy discussion of the subject since 
Bajakajian occurred in Paroline v United States, 134 S Ct 1710 (2014), in which the 
Court considered the scope of restitution available to victims of child pornography. Id at 
1716. There, the Court concluded that a defendant in such a case should be made liable 
only for the consequences and gravity of his own conduct, not the conduct of others. See 
id at 1725–26. In so holding, the Court remarked that to do otherwise, making “a single 
possessor” of a victim’s images “liable for millions of dollars in losses collectively caused 
by thousands of independent actors might be excessive and disproportionate” under the 
Excessive Fines Clause. Id at 1726. 
 194 Colgan, 102 Cal L Rev at 295 n 92 (cited in note 7) (detailing disagreement in the 
lower courts both as to “what a fine is and the question of what renders a fine excessive”).  
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analytic process.”195 For our purposes, two observations bear 
mentioning. First, seizing on Bajakajian’s emphasis on the 
magnitude of authorized penalties, lower courts have found that 
nearly any fine within the range prescribed by a legislature is 
constitutional. The upshot is that a government’s decision to au-
thorize income-based fines will, in and of itself, erect a signifi-
cant barrier to challenge under the Excessive Fines Clause. Se-
cond, courts are divided as to whether, and how, the finances of 
a defendant should factor into the constitutional analysis.196 
In concluding that the defendant showed a “minimal level of 
culpability,” the Bajakajian Court discussed an array of factors: 
that the crime of conviction was “solely a reporting offense”; that 
the defendant’s conduct was “unrelated to any other illegal ac-
tivities”; that the defendant was not within “the class of persons 
for whom the statute was principally designed”; and that, under 
the Sentencing Guidelines, the forfeiture at issue far exceeded 
the maximum authorized fine.197 Lower courts, however, have 
largely made this last consideration—whether a challenged fine 
is within the range authorized by statute or guidelines—the lo-
cus of the constitutional inquiry. As one court observed after 
surveying the landscape of post-Bajakajian challenges, “[I]t is 
doubtful that a penalty that is . . . less than the total maximum 
penalty authorized by law could ever be grossly disproportional 
 
 195 Collins v Securities and Exchange Commission, 736 F3d 521, 527 (DC Cir 2013). 
 196 Courts are also divided as to whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to the 
states at all, and at the time of publication, the Supreme Court has granted cert in 
Indiana v Timbs, 84 NE3d 1179 (Ind 2017), to consider precisely that question. Timbs v 
Indiana, 138 S Ct 2650 (2018). If it doesn’t apply to the states, the clause will obviously 
be no impediment to state efforts to implement income-based fines. Compare Timbs, 84 
NE3d at 1182 (holding that the clause is not incorporated); Montana v Forfeiture of 2003 
Chevrolet, 202 P3d 782, 783 (Mont 2009) (same); Reyes v North Texas Tollway Authority, 
830 F Supp 2d 194, 207 (ND Tex 2011) (same), with Pennsylvania v 1997 Chevrolet, 160 
A3d 153, 162 n 7 (Pa 2017) (noting that the clause is incorporated); Watson v Johnson 
Mobile Homes, 284 F3d 568, 572 (5th Cir 2002) (same). See also Wright v Riveland, 219 
F3d 905, 915–19 (9th Cir 2000) (applying the Excessive Fines Clause to state action sub 
silentio); Towers v City of Chicago, 173 F3d 619, 623–24 (7th Cir 1999) (same). The 
Supreme Court has up to this point sent—in dicta—conflicting signals. Compare, for 
example, McDonald v City of Chicago, 561 US 742, 765 n 13 (2010) (“We never have 
decided whether the Third Amendment or the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of 
excessive fines applies to the States through the Due Process Clause.”), with Cooper 
Industries, 532 US at 433–34 (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
. . . makes the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and 
unusual punishments applicable to the States.”). 
 197 Bajakajian, 524 US at 337–39. 
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to the offense’s gravity.”198 Indeed, the dominant position ap-
pears to be that if a fine falls “within the range of fines pre-
scribed by Congress, a strong presumption arises that the [fine] 
is constitutional,”199 and some courts have said that “careful[ ] 
consider[ation]” of the Bajakajian factors is necessary only if the 
fine at issue “exceeds the statutory and Guideline maximum 
fines.”200 Even when it is framed as a presumption, many courts 
have treated the fact that a fine falls within the authorized 
range as determinative.201 
The logic behind this emphasis is plain: it stresses deference 
to legislative determinations about what punishment is appro-
priate, and by “[t]ranslating the gravity of a crime into monetary 
terms,”202 it reduces Bajakajian’s multifactor test—which runs 
the risk of subjective application—into a matter of elementary 
school arithmetic. Of course, taken to an extreme, it threatens to 
make a mockery of the Excessive Fines Clause because fines, no 
matter how steep, will pass muster so long as they are author-
ized. As the Bajakajian Court itself cautioned, legislative au-
thorization “cannot override the constitutional requirement of 
 
 198 Pacific Ranger, LLC v Pritzker, 211 F Supp 3d 196, 226 (DDC 2016). See also 
Pharaon v Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 135 F3d 148, 157 (DC Cir 
1998) (rejecting an Excessive Fines Clause argument because “the penalty is proportional 
to [the] violation and well below the statutory maximum”); United States v Mackby, 221 F 
Supp 2d 1106, 1110 (ND Cal 2002) (observing that “federal courts have consistently found 
that civil penalty awards in which the amount of the award is less than the statutory 
maximum do not run afoul of the Excessive Fines Clause” and collecting cases). 
 199 United States v 817 NE 29th Drive, 175 F3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir 1999) (empha-
sis added). See also United States v Varrone, 554 F3d 327, 331–32 (2d Cir 2009) (collect-
ing cases); United States v Heldeman, 402 F3d 220, 223 & n 1 (1st Cir 2005) (noting that 
“[s]ome circuits have treated a forfeiture of less than the statutory or guideline maxi-
mum as strongly suggesting or conclusive of compliance with the Eighth Amendment” 
and collecting cases); 817 NE 29th Drive, 175 F3d at 1309–10 n 9 (observing that the 
converse is not true—“the fact that a forfeiture within the congressionally mandated 
range of fines is presumptively constitutional does not mean that a forfeiture outside of 
that range is presumptively unconstitutional”). 
 200 Varrone, 554 F3d at 332. 
 201 See, for example, United States v Bernitt, 392 F3d 873, 880–81 (7th Cir 2004): 
Bernitt’s penalty of $115,500 is significantly lower than the total penalty that 
the district court could have imposed. Given the potential punishment the dis-
trict court could have imposed on Bernitt, the government’s seizure of Bernitt’s 
property valued at $115,500 is not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of 
the harm the jury found Bernitt caused. 
See also 817 NE 29th Drive, 175 F3d at 1310–11 (“[T]he sentencing guidelines and the 
statute agree that a fine of up to $1,000,000 would be proportional to [defendant’s] 
crimes; consequently, the forfeiture of a $70,000 property based on those crimes does not 
violate the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 202 817 NE 29th Drive, 175 F3d at 1309. 
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proportionality review.”203 Whatever its merits, the implication 
of this approach for income-based fines is clear: so long as it is 
authorized by a statute, even a system that imposed heavy fines 
on the wealthy would be relatively secure against constitutional 
challenge. 
Not all of the developments in the lower courts since  
Bajakajian augur in favor of the constitutionality of income-
based fines. Indeed, courts are divided as to whether, and how, 
the financial circumstances of a defendant should factor into the 
constitutional analysis, with many concluding that courts should 
ignore, or sharply cabin, consideration of an offender’s means. 
As mentioned above,204 Bajakajian expressly reserved the ques-
tion whether the Excessive Fines Clause, which has roots in 
Magna Carta’s requirement that “amercements . . . be propor-
tioned to the offense and that they should not deprive a wrong-
doer of his livelihood,”205 requires or constrains consideration of 
an offender’s financial circumstances.206 Since that decision, 
some courts, including the Eleventh Circuit, have held that they 
should “not take into account the personal impact of a forfeiture 
on the specific defendant in determining whether the forfeiture 
violates the Eighth Amendment.”207 Curiously, the Eleventh  
Circuit suggested that this result flowed from Bajakajian itself.208 
The First and Second Circuits, by contrast, while agreeing that 
“a defendant’s inability to satisfy a forfeiture at the time of con-
viction, in and of itself, is not at all sufficient to render a forfei-
ture unconstitutional” have concluded, following Magna Carta, 
that a fine that “effectively would deprive the defendant of his or 
 
 203 Bajakajian, 524 US at 339 n 14. 
 204 See text accompanying note 186. 
 205 Id at 335. See note 164 and accompanying text. 
 206 See Bajakajian, 524 US at 340 n 15. 
 207 United States v Dicter, 198 F3d 1284, 1292 n 11 (11th Cir 1999). See also, for ex-
ample, United States v Smith, 656 F3d 821, 828 (8th Cir 2011) (rejecting a claim that a 
money judgment is an excessive fine on the grounds of indigence); United States v Dubose, 
146 F3d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir 1998) (“[A]n Eighth Amendment gross disproportionality 
analysis does not require an inquiry into the hardship the sanction may work on the of-
fender.”); Duckworth v United States, 705 F Supp 2d 30, 48 (DDC 2010) (“[A]bility to pay is 
not a component of the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis.”). 
 208 See 817 NE 29th Drive, 175 F3d at 1311. An intermediate appellate court in  
Oregon, by contrast, cited Bajakajian for exactly the opposite proposition: “Whether an 
otherwise proportional fine is excessive can depend on, for example, the financial re-
sources available to a defendant, the other financial obligations of the defendant, and the 
effect of the fine on the defendant’s ability to be self-sufficient.” Oregon v Goodenow, 282 
P3d 8, 17 (Or App 2012), citing Bajakajian, 524 US at 335–36. 
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her livelihood” would violate the Constitution.209 In other words, 
those courts that have considered the financial circumstances of 
offenders have distinguished whether a fine would “destroy a de-
fendant’s future livelihood” (which is grounds for finding a fine 
unconstitutionally excessive) from consideration of “a defend-
ant’s present personal circumstances, including age, health, and 
financial situation” (which is not).210 
Because whether the clause limits overly burdensome fines 
on the poor is a topic well covered by other scholarship, this  
Article is concerned with that question only to the extent it 
bears on the imposition of heavy fines on the rich.211 And on 
their face, statements such as the Eleventh Circuit’s suggest 
that income-based fines could face significant obstacles under 
the Excessive Fines Clause. After all, if a court must ignore an 
offender’s financial circumstances in determining whether a fine 
is grossly disproportional, then a $100,000 parking ticket as-
sessed to a billionaire would receive the same scrutiny as a 
$100,000 ticket assessed to someone living in poverty. The con-
sequence, if the Excessive Fines Clause has any teeth, would be 
invalidation of both. 
Read in context, however, there is little reason to believe 
these broad prohibitions on the consideration of income will 
stand in the way of income-based fines. For one, the courts to 
have confronted the question of financial circumstances have 
done so by way of asking if the Excessive Fines Clause requires 
courts to invalidate state-chosen sanctions as imposing uncon-
stitutionally burdensome fines on the poor.212 In that setting, the 
 
 209 United States v Levesque, 546 F3d 78, 84–85 (1st Cir 2008). See also United 
States v Fogg, 666 F3d 13, 19 (1st Cir 2011); United States v Viloski, 814 F3d 104, 111–
12 (2d Cir 2016). The First and Second Circuits disagree about how exactly this inquiry 
should be conducted. See Viloski, 814 F3d at 111–12 & n 12 (noting that, while in the 
Second Circuit, “[w]hether a forfeiture would destroy a defendant’s livelihood is a com-
ponent of the proportionality analysis, not a separate inquiry,” the First Circuit “re-
quire[es] a separate inquiry as to whether a forfeiture would deprive a defendant of his 
livelihood”) (emphasis added), citing Levesque, 546 F3d at 85. See also Pennsylvania v 
1997 Chevrolet, 160 A3d 153, 189 (Pa 2017). 
 210 Viloski, 814 F3d at 112. 
 211 See note 7 and accompanying text. Importantly, even those scholars who have 
argued that the Excessive Fines Clause contains a “livelihood-protection” principle that 
would prevent the imposition of overly burdensome fines have acknowledged the differ-
ence between that rule and one that would more broadly require a direct relationship 
between fines and offender means. See McLean, 40 Hastings Const L Q at 890 n 211 
(cited in note 7). 
 212 Academic study of the Excessive Fines Clause has similarly focused on the ques-
tion of burdensome fines on the poor. See note 7. 
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powerful deference accorded to state penological judgment mili-
tates against preventing the state from imposing its preferred 
penalty. When, instead, the question is whether the Excessive 
Fines Clause prohibits a state from taking income into account, 
that same deference weighs in favor of income-based fines. Be-
cause deference is the animating rationale behind many of the 
decisions rejecting consideration of income,213 one would assume 
that principle will apply neutrally and not as a one-way ratchet 
against the poor. 
For another, at least some of the courts to suggest that the 
financial circumstances of an offender have no constitutional 
relevance have signaled that this rule is related, in part, to 
factors special to criminal forfeiture as opposed to other types of 
fines.214 For example, the Second Circuit has explained that 
criminal forfeiture is designed to take from an offender the 
proceeds of crime as well as property used in connection with 
crime, both of which are unrelated to an offender’s financial 
circumstances.215 As a result, “forfeitures should be ‘concerned 
not with how much an individual has but with how much he 
received in connection with the commission of the crime.’”216 
When determining the severity of other penalties, by contrast, a 
more individualized inquiry, taking into account the nature and 
 
 213 At least those decisions that provide any rationale for their holdings. See, for ex-
ample, Viloski, 814 F3d at 112 (explaining that the need to defer to Congress compels 
the conclusion that “courts may not consider as a discrete factor a defendant’s personal 
circumstances, such as . . . present financial condition”). But see Duckworth, 705 F Supp 
2d at 48 (concluding without analysis that “ability to pay is not a component of the 
Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis”). 
 214 Indeed, because the value of property sought under forfeiture so often dwarfs the 
size of traditional fines, a significant portion of Excessive Fines Clause cases concern  
forfeiture. 
 215 See, for example, Viloski, 814 F3d at 110–13; Securities and Exchange  
Commission v Contorinis, 743 F3d 296, 310 (2d Cir 2014) (noting that “forfeiture is ‘de-
signed primarily to confiscate property used in violation of the law, and to require dis-
gorgement of the fruits of illegal conduct’”), quoting Ursery, 518 US at 284. See also 21 
USC § 853(a)(1)–(2) (providing that an individual convicted of certain offenses “shall for-
feit to the United States . . . any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the 
person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation” as well as  
“property used, or intended to be used, in any matter or part, to commit, or to facilitate 
the commission of” crime). 
 216 Viloski, 814 F3d at 113, quoting United States v Awad, 598 F3d 76, 78 (2d Cir 
2010). Relatedly, some courts have suggested that a criminal forfeiture cannot be 
“grossly disproportional” if the “proceeds from [ ] criminal activity [ ] are well in excess of 
the amount of forfeiture.” See also United States v All Assets Held at Bank Julius, 229 F 
Supp 3d 62, 71 (DDC 2017). 
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circumstances of the offender, is appropriate.217 By this logic, the 
Excessive Fines Clause may more readily permit consideration 
of an offender’s means when financial sanctions other than 
forfeiture are at play.218 
3. Gross disproportionality under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause. 
Because Bajakajian “adopt[ed] the standard of gross dispro-
portionality articulated in [the Court’s] Cruel and Unusual  
Punishments Clause precedents,”219 the next step is to plumb 
those cases for clues. Even the Court itself, however, has com-
mented on the doctrine’s inscrutability: “Our cases exhibit a lack 
of clarity regarding what factors may indicate gross dispropor-
tionality.”220 The strand of that doctrine most applicable to  
income-based fines, concerning challenges to the length of im-
prisonment, is particularly fractured, with no single rationale 
uniting a majority of the Court.221 Still, these cases reveal a 
number of factors likely to play into the question of income-
based fines—particularly whether, and under what circum-
stances, such a system will need caps to guard against weighty 
fines on the rich. 
 
 217 Viloski, 814 F3d at 111 n 11. 
 218 See Goodenow, 282 P3d at 19: 
As a general matter, separating a criminal defendant from the direct proceeds 
of her crimes is an appropriate—not an excessive—punishment. It serves legit-
imate retributive and deterrent purposes, and it takes from the defendant only 
that which she should not have received in the first place. As a punishment, its 
severity is minimal; it has no effect on the defendant’s legitimate financial po-
sition. It simply returns the defendant to the position that she would have been 
in had she not committed her crimes. 
 
. . . 
 
To illustrate: a judgment that requires a defendant to pay a fine, under cir-
cumstances in which the fine must be paid from legally obtained funds, is en-
tirely different from a court order that a defendant forfeit illegally obtained 
funds. The fine has a negative effect on the defendant’s legitimate financial po-
sition; the forfeiture does not. 
How to square this distinction with Bajakajian itself, which if anything rejected the no-
tion that there is something special about forfeiture as opposed to other financial sanc-
tions for purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause, is another matter. See Bajakajian, 524 
US at 333–34. 
 219 Bajakajian, 524 US at 336. 
 220 Lockyer v Andrade, 538 US 63, 72 (2003) (collecting cases). 
 221 Id, quoting Helm, 463 US at 1001 (Kennedy concurring) (“[W]e lack clear objec-
tive standards to distinguish between sentences for different terms of years.”). 
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The Court’s Cruel and Unusual Clause disproportionality 
cases fall into two categories.222 In the first, the Court has  
announced categorical restrictions on the death penalty, such as 
prohibitions on capital punishment for crimes other than homi-
cide.223 In the second, the Court has entertained “challenges to 
the length of term-of-years sentences given all the circumstances 
in a particular case.”224 And though they have a common source, 
the Court has by and large been careful to keep these two lines 
of cases separate, each with its own distinct test.225 In  
Bajakajian, the Court adopted the standard articulated in the 
term-of-years cases.226 Under that inquiry, a court “begin[s] by 
comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sen-
tence.”227 Unlike in Bajakajian, however, this question is a 
“threshold comparison,” which, if it “leads to an inference of 
gross disproportionality,” triggers a “comparative analysis” of 
“the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other 
offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences im-
posed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.”228 Only “[i]f this 
 
 222 See Graham v Florida, 560 US 48, 59 (2010). 
 223 See id at 60–61. See also Kennedy v Louisiana, 554 US 407, 413 (2008) (holding 
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for the crime 
of raping a child). 
 224 See Graham, 560 US at 59. There is likely a third category concerning the pun-
ishment of children. See Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460, 481–82 (2012). There are also 
cases that do not fall neatly into this schematic, such as Robinson v California, 370 US 
660 (1962), in which the Court invalidated a ninety-day sentence for the crime of drug 
addiction. Id at 667. But whether that case was an application of the Eighth  
Amendment’s proportionality principle is contested. See Harmelin, 501 US at 993 n 14 
(Scalia opinion). 
 225 When it comes to disproportionality review, “death is different.” Harmelin, 501 
US at 994 (Scalia opinion). See also id at 1000 (Kennedy concurring) (“[B]ecause the 
penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, the objective line 
between capital punishment and imprisonment for a term of years finds frequent men-
tion in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted); 
Graham, 560 US at 60–61 (describing the different tests that the Court has applied in 
the death and term-of-years contexts). 
 226 Bajakajian, 524 US at 336, citing Helm, 463 US at 288, and Rummel, 445 US 
at 271. 
 227 Graham, 560 US at 60. 
 228 Id. The Bajakajian Court did engage in a form of comparative analysis when it 
compared the defendant’s Guideline sentence to the Guideline sentences of other offend-
ers. But while the Bajakajian Court compared the sentence imposed only to others 
available under the same scheme, the comparative analysis in the Court’s gross dispro-
portionality cases have taken a broader view, analyzing punishments across statutes 
and across jurisdictions. See Ewing v California, 538 US 11, 43–45 (2003) (Breyer dis-
senting); Helm, 463 US at 288–89. If few jurisdictions pursued income-based fines, a 
cross-jurisdictional comparative analysis would obviously cast more suspicion on such 
schemes than an intrajurisdictional comparison. 
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comparative analysis validates an initial judgment that the sen-
tence is grossly disproportionate” is the sentence struck down.229 
If there is one thing to take away from the Court’s length-of-
incarceration cases, it is—again—the powerful deference  
afforded to legislative judgments. Only once has the Court 
struck down a term of years as grossly disproportional: in Solem 
v Helm,230 when it invalidated a sentence of life without parole 
for the crime of passing a worthless check, the defendant’s sev-
enth nonviolent felony.231 In contrast, it has rejected a challenge 
to a sentence of twenty-five years to life for the theft of three golf 
clubs under California’s three-strikes law;232 upheld a sentence 
of life without parole for possessing a large quantity of co-
caine;233 sustained a sentence of life with the possibility of parole 
for the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses, the defend-
ant’s third nonviolent felony;234 and countenanced a sentence of 
forty years for possession of marijuana with the intent to dis-
tribute and distribution of marijuana.235 The factors that explain 
this deference are by now familiar: “[T]he primacy of the legisla-
ture, the variety of legitimate penological schemes, the nature of 
our federal system,” and the difficulty of developing “objective 
standards to distinguish between sentences for different terms 
of years.”236 
Unlike Bajakajian itself, which was largely silent as to the 
meaning of proportionality and, if anything, suggested a purely 
retributive view, these gross disproportionality cases have  
mostly embraced a nonretributive one. Under this standard, a 
state is free to designate the purposes of punishment, but pro-
portionality requires that there be a meaningful relationship be-
tween those goals and the punishment imposed, as opposed to a 
sanction that is unnecessary or gratuitous when measured 
against its purposes. As O’Connor put it in Ewing v  
California,237 “It is enough that the State . . . has a reasonable 
basis for believing that dramatically enhanced sentences . . . 
‘advance[ ] the goals of [its] criminal justice system in any  
 
 229 Graham, 560 US at 60 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 230 463 US 277 (1983). 
 231 Id at 303. 
 232 Ewing, 538 US at 30–31 (O’Connor) (plurality). 
 233 Harmelin, 501 US at 961, 996. 
 234 Rummel, 445 US at 265–66. 
 235 Hutto v Davis, 454 US 370, 371–72 (1982). 
 236 Harmelin, 501 US at 1001 (Kennedy concurring). 
 237 538 US 11 (2003). 
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substantial way.’”238 Under the retributive model, by contrast, it 
is wrong to punish an individual to a greater degree than offense 
seriousness would dictate, no matter whether it would serve so-
cietal interests like deterrence and incapacitation.239 Once one 
accepts the principle that the Constitution does not mandate 
any one penological theory, the reason for the dominance of the 
nonretributive model is clear: the alternative constitutionalizes 
one purpose of punishment over the others by invalidating state 
action that serves those other ends. That the state will be able to 
justify income-based fines in part on their increased deterrence 
benefits could bode well for their constitutionality. 
But while the Court has repeatedly emphasized the role 
that interests like deterrence and incapacitation may play in 
justifying harsh sanctions, there is disagreement—among cases 
and among members of the Court—about how strictly to scruti-
nize the nexus between those interests and a state’s chosen 
sanction. The Court’s decision in Ewing is illustrative. For the 
plurality, O’Connor wrote that California’s three-strikes law was 
designed to combat recidivism by increasing the deterrence and 
incapacitation of repeat offenders.240 These justifications, she 
stressed, were “no pretext”—“[r]ecidivism is a serious public 
safety concern,” with some “67 percent of former inmates re-
leased from state prisons [ ] charged with at least one ‘serious’ 
new crime within three years of their release.”241 And she ob-
served statistics suggesting that recidivism had markedly de-
clined among the target population in the wake of the new 
law.242 In dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer more closely examined 
the state’s policy. Rather than consider the state’s interest in de-
terrence writ large, he asked whether the lengthy sentence fur-
thered the state’s interest in deterring the crime of conviction: 
shoplifting.243 On this point, he noted the absence of any  
 
 238 Id at 28 (O’Connor) (plurality). In Ewing, both the plurality by O’Connor and the 
dissent by Justice Stephen Breyer adopted this view, meaning that seven of the nine jus-
tices at that time accepted some version of the nonretributive framework. See id at 28–
30 (O’Connor) (plurality); id at 51 (Breyer dissenting) (asking whether the punishment 
“would further a significant criminal justice objective”). 
 239 See Rummel, 445 US at 288 (Powell dissenting) (“The inquiry focuses on whether 
a person deserves such punishment, not simply on whether punishment would serve a 
utilitarian goal. A statute that levied a mandatory life sentence for overtime parking 
might well deter vehicular lawlessness, but it would offend our felt sense of justice.”). 
 240 See Ewing, 538 US at 25 (O’Connor) (plurality). 
 241 Id at 26. 
 242 See id at 27. 
 243 See id at 40–41 (Breyer dissenting). 
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“evidence presented here that the law enforcement community 
believes lengthy prison terms necessary adequately to deter 
shoplifting” and observed that other methods of detecting (and 
thus deterring) shoplifting were available.244 
Under the more permissive strand of nonretributive propor-
tionality, the deterrence logic behind income-based fines could 
alone be enough to pass constitutional muster: fines need to 
scale with income to deter wealthy offenders. Under the stricter 
version, the constitutionality of heavy income-based fines on the 
wealthy could vary from offense to offense, with heavy income-
based fines able to survive only for those offenses for which 
there is reason to believe that a harsher sanction is necessary. 
Under either view, wealthy offenders will argue against exorbi-
tant income-based fines on the ground that a lower financial 
sanction would have had an adequate deterrent effect, an objec-
tion that will perhaps be more plausible for those offenses for 
which the expected value of commission is ascertainable and un-
related to income.245 Importantly, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized the legitimacy of deterrence—and not merely the law and 
economics varietal.246 As a result, the deterrence value of  
income-based fines ought to be measured not in terms of optimal 
social value but in terms of whether the severity of the sanction 
meaningfully decreases the likelihood that a rule will be broken. 
Relatedly, when asking whether a given financial sanction 
is gratuitous in relation to its ends, a court might take into 
account not only whether a lower fine would suffice but also the 
state’s choice to impose a financial penalty as opposed to other, 
more severe forms of punishment like incarceration. When 
compared to prison, even a hefty income-based fine could look 
proportional. Of course, it is much more difficult to compare 
severity across modes of punishment than within one. 
Although nonretributive proportionality is the consensus 
view, Justice Antonin Scalia suggested that “[p]roportionality—
 
 244 Ewing, 538 US at 40 (Breyer dissenting). 
 245 This is because, in purely rational terms, if the expected value of the commission 
of an offense (pricing in the likelihood of detection) is constant at $1,000, then any  
penalty above that amount is adequate to deter, meaning that a penalty far above that 
amount is gratuitous. If, however, the value of the commission of an offense varies with 
income—for instance, if the price an individual is willing to pay in order to speed in-
creases along with their wealth—then the state can more easily argue that fines must 
scale with income in order to deter. 
 246 See, for example, Cooper Industries, 532 US at 439–40; BMW of North America, 
Inc v Gore, 517 US 559, 592–93 (1996) (Breyer concurring). 
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the notion that the punishment should fit the crime—is inher-
ently a concept tied to the penological goal of retribution.”247 For 
him, “it becomes difficult even to speak intelligently of ‘propor-
tionality,’ once deterrence and rehabilitation are given signifi-
cant weight.”248 This is so, he said, because once the size of the 
penalty is tailored to deter, rather than merely to fit the gravity 
of an offense, the size of the penalty can become wildly unhinged 
from the seriousness of an offense: 
[S]ince deterrent effect depends not only upon the amount 
of the penalty but upon its certainty, crimes that are less 
grave but significantly more difficult to detect may warrant 
substantially higher penalties. Grave crimes of the sort that 
will not be deterred by penalty may warrant substantially 
lower penalties, as may grave crimes of the sort that are 
normally committed once in a lifetime by otherwise law-
abiding citizens who will not profit from rehabilitation.249 
Undoubtedly, once a fine is tailored to serve multiple ends, it 
will no longer correspond to any one of them. Yet it is by no 
means clear that proportionality becomes any less intelligible—
if that means judicially administrable—if deterrence, rather 
than retribution alone, is a factor. The question whether a given 
sanction will deter conduct is more susceptible to “objective” re-
view, through evidence and empirical measurement, than the 
question of how grave a given crime is.250 But insofar as Scalia 
was accusing the Court of misdescribing the nature of its pro-
portionality inquiry, he was on the money. As he said, what the 
Court has “read[ ] into the Eighth Amendment is not the [ ] 
proposition that all punishment should be reasonably propor-
tionate to the gravity of the offense, but rather the [ ] proposi-
tion that all punishment should reasonably pursue the multiple 
purposes of the criminal law.”251 That summarizes well the non-
retributive view.252 
 
 247 Ewing, 538 US at 31 (Scalia concurring). 
 248 Harmelin, 501 US at 989 (Scalia opinion). 
 249 Id. 
 250 As Scalia observed, it is enormously difficult to identify “objective” indicia of the 
gravity of an offense. See id at 987–88. 
 251 Ewing, 538 US at 32 (Scalia concurring). 
 252 Scalia contended that proportionality is inherently a retributive concept in ser-
vice of his larger argument that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not 
contain a gross disproportionality principle but rather prohibits only modes of punish-
ment that are “cruel and unusual.” Harmelin, 501 US at 976 (Scalia opinion). Whatever 
the merits of that view, it is clear that the Excessive Fines Clause does contain a  
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The Court’s Cruel and Unusual Clause cases elsewhere hint 
at the presence and continued viability of the retributive view, 
not so much as a substitute for the nonretributive model but as 
an overlapping constraint. As Justice Lewis Powell put it in his 
Rummel v Estelle253 dissent: “The [gross disproportionality] in-
quiry focuses on whether a person deserves such punishment, 
not simply on whether punishment would serve a utilitarian 
goal. A statute that levied a mandatory life sentence for over-
time parking might well deter vehicular lawlessness, but it 
would offend our felt sense of justice.”254 In other words, states 
may take into account ends other than retribution, but there is a 
retributive upper limit on the severity of sanctions.255 The 
Court’s capital punishment line of cases has at times expressly 
suggested that nonretributive and retributive versions of dis-
proportionality can simultaneously circumscribe punishment: 
“[A] punishment is ‘excessive’ and unconstitutional if it 
(1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of pun-
ishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and 
needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of 
proportion to the severity of the crime.”256 
Supposing there is some retributive upper limit in the  
Excessive Fines Clause, the result is hardly fatal for income-
based fines. As already discussed, income-based fines could 
serve purely retributive ends according to a theory of subjective 
retribution. Powell’s discussion in Rummel suggests that the ra-
tionale behind the retributive upper limit is a fear that the non-
retributive view is inadequate because it allows barbaric sen-
tences in the name of interests like deterrence and 
incapacitation. But from the perspective of subjective retribu-
tion, a heavy fine imposed on a wealthy person is no more  
barbarous than a similarly proportioned fine on a person with-
out means. Rather, a fine might be gratuitous given the  
 
proportionality principle; it bans excessive fines, and it polices only one mode of punish-
ment: the financial sanction. As a result, it’s hardly clear that this line of criticism can be 
intelligibly transposed into the realm of excessive fines. 
 253 445 US 263 (1980). 
 254 Rummel, 445 US at 288 (Powell dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 255 Frase calls this concept “limiting retributivism.” Frase, 89 Minn L Rev at 591–93 
(cited in note 137). It “allows all traditional punishment purposes to play a role but  
places retributive outer limits both on who may be punished (only those who are blame-
worthy), and how hard they may be punished (within a range of penalties which would 
be widely viewed as neither unfairly severe or unduly lenient).” Id at 591. 
 256 Coker v Georgia, 433 US 584, 592 (1977) (White) (plurality) (emphasis added). 
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percentage of a person’s income it entails—a total financial 
wipeout is different than a fine that represents 1 percent of in-
come—but not based on its absolute magnitude. For this reason, 
it’s by no means obvious that the logic behind a retributive up-
per limit applies when income-based fines—rather than prison 
or the thumbscrew—are on the table. 
Perhaps counterintuitively, it may be easier to defend  
income-based fines in terms of subjective retribution than on the 
basis of deterrence. Wealthy offenders will attack the deterrence 
rationale by arguing that a lower financial sanction would have 
sufficed to dissuade their conduct, and one can imagine evi-
dence, empirical and otherwise, to support such an argument. A 
similar challenge to a fine as overly retributive, given the rela-
tive subjectivity of that judgment and the resultant paucity of 
available evidence to support it, could be more likely to come 
across as an attempt to have a court substitute its own assess-
ment of the gravity of an offense for that of the legislature.257 
Likewise, if subjective retribution is recognized as a legitimate 
goal, a $100,000 fine imposed on a millionaire and a $100 fine on 
someone earning $10,000 a year will rise and fall together, giv-
ing courts little room to police burdensome fines on the wealthy 
without disrupting a system of financial sanctions they have 
long abided. 
If, nonetheless, a retributive upper limit operates as a rela-
tionship between the absolute value of a fine and the gravity of 
the offense, a Finland-style system without a ceiling on the size 
of income-based fines is out of the question. That said, govern-
ments could still proportion fines to income so long as they cap 
maximum fines at levels related to offense seriousness; and  
given the deference generally afforded states in setting punish-
ment, these caps could likely be quite high. Indeed, when fines 
are imposed for serious offenses like felonies—in addition to, or 
in lieu of incarceration—the Excessive Fines Clause would seem 
to pose little obstacle to income-based fines with hefty  
 
 257 In the context of due process limits on the award of punitive damages, Breyer 
has made a similar observation:  
Since a fixed dollar award will punish a poor person more than a wealthy one, 
one can understand the relevance of [the defendant’s wealth] to the State’s in-
terest in retribution (though not necessarily to its interest in deterrence, given 
the more distant relation between a defendant’s wealth and its responses to 
economic incentives). 
BMW, 517 US at 591 (Breyer concurring). 
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maximums. After all, if a sentence of twenty-five years to life is 
not grossly disproportional to the gravity of shoplifting three golf 
clubs, one would presume that a financial sanction, even one in 
the hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars, could likewise 
pass muster. It would be odd indeed if the Court were to more 
aggressively constrain financial sanctions—which “cannot ap-
proximate in severity the loss of liberty that a prison term en-
tails”258—than incarceration, at least so long as the Excessive 
Fines Clause is thought to embody the same standard of gross 
disproportionality as the Cruel and Unusual Clause.259 
As for the punishment of less serious offenses—from mis-
demeanor crimes to parking violations260—lower caps will be 
necessary, but here too legislatures have room to scale fines to 
income. The one-size-fits-all nature of tariff fines means that, 
under the status quo, monetary penalties may frequently under-
sanction relative to desire, even in purely retributive terms. 
Thus, even for low-level offenses, governments could set maxi-
mum fines high enough to fully reflect society’s desire to sanc-
tion, with penalties scaling down from there as offender income 
declines. 
4. Due process and grossly excessive punitive damages 
awards. 
Finally, because the Court has held that due process places 
substantive limitations on “grossly excessive” punitive damage 
awards in civil suits261 using a test that is closely related to the 
Eighth Amendment’s standard of gross disproportionality,262 it is 
worth briefly investigating how that line of cases could inform 
the constitutionality of income-based fines.263 
 
 258 Blanton, 489 US at 542. 
 259 Of course, some argue that the Excessive Fines Clause does embody a stricter 
standard. See, for example, Johnson, 2000 U Ill L Rev at 506 (cited in note 167). 
 260 Powell’s dissent in Rummel uses “overtime parking” to illustrate the kind of low-
gravity offense that could not, consistent with the standard of gross disproportionality, 
be punished with lifetime imprisonment. See Rummel, 445 US at 288 (Powell dissent-
ing). Since then, the Court has continued to use overtime parking as an archetypal ex-
ample of a low-level offense. See, for example, Ewing, 538 US at 35 (Stevens dissenting); 
Harmelin, 501 US at 963–64 (Scalia opinion), 1009 (Kennedy concurring). 
 261 See State Farm, 538 US at 416. 
 262 See Cooper Industries, 532 US at 434–35 (comparing the due process test with 
gross disproportionality under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments and Excessive Fines 
Clauses). 
 263 For reasons I discuss in Part III.A.2, that doctrine is unlikely to, of its own force, 
impose limits on the excessiveness of fines beyond those derived from the Excessive 
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First, while the Court’s punitive damages cases also veer 
between the retributive and nonretributive models of propor-
tionality,264 the Court has expressly discussed the role that 
wealth can play in determining the size of punitive awards. To 
resummarize O’Connor’s view of offender wealth and punitive 
damages: because the Constitution does not mandate any one 
penological or economic theory and because there is clear histor-
ical precedent for taking financial circumstances into account 
when setting fines, the state is entitled to do so.265 But in the 
same passage, O’Connor suggested nonetheless that there is “a 
substantive ceiling on the amount of a monetary sanction,”266 
which may indicate that in her view there is yet some retribu-
tive upper limit, whether it be relative or absolute. 
Breyer’s concurrence in BMW of North America, Inc v 
Gore267 confronted the same subject.268 That case concerned a  
jury award of $4 million in punitive damages against a car seller 
who failed to tell a buyer that his car had been repainted prior 
to sale—an omission that meant the car was worth $4,000 less 
than expected.269 On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court re-
duced the award to $2 million in punitive damages—the amount 
 
Fines Clause. Moreover, many of the concerns that animate due process limits on puni-
tive damages awards simply don’t apply to statutorily authorized fines. As the Court has 
explained, limits on the extent to which punitive damages can exceed actual damages 
are rooted in concerns about arbitrariness—caused by juries given wide discretion to 
choose the amount of punitive damages—and in the need to provide fair notice to de-
fendants about the severity of the penalties to which they may be subjected. See State 
Farm, 538 US at 416–18. See also Exxon Shipping Co v Baker, 554 US 471, 499 (2008) 
(“The real problem, it seems, is the stark unpredictability of punitive awards.”). But nei-
ther of these concerns is present when a statutory scheme expressly authorizes income-
based fines. 
 264 Compare BMW, 517 US at 575 (“Perhaps the most important indicium of the 
reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the de-
fendant’s conduct.”); id at 580 (“Because this case exhibits none of the circumstances or-
dinarily associated with egregiously improper conduct, we are persuaded that BMW’s 
conduct was not sufficiently reprehensible to warrant imposition of a $2 million exem-
plary damages award.”), with id at 568 (“Only when an award can fairly be categorized 
as ‘grossly excessive’ in relation to [the State’s legitimate interests in punishment and 
deterrence] does it enter a zone of arbitrariness that violates” due process); id at 584 
(“The sanction imposed in this case cannot be justified on the ground that it was neces-
sary to deter future misconduct without considering whether less drastic remedies could 
be expected to achieve that goal.”). 
 265 See Browning-Ferris, 492 US at 300 (O’Connor concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 266 Id. 
 267 517 US 559 (1996). 
 268 Id at 592–93 (Breyer concurring). 
 269 Id at 563–65. 
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it deemed constitutionally reasonable.270 Agreeing with the 
Court that the punitive damages award violated due process, 
Breyer stressed that the test applied by the Alabama Supreme 
Court to rein in the jury’s verdict was incapable of “signifi-
cant[ly] constrain[ing]” jury awards or “protect[ing] against arbi-
trary results.”271 Notable for our purposes, he observed that the 
Alabama test expressly considered the “financial position” of the 
defendant but that this factor was hardly any constraint on the 
jury’s verdict: 
Since a fixed dollar award will punish a poor person more 
than a wealthy one, one can understand the relevance of 
[the financial position of the defendant] to the State’s inter-
est[s]. . . . This factor, however, is not necessarily intended 
to act as a significant constraint on punitive awards. Ra-
ther, it provides an open-ended basis for inflating awards 
when the defendant is wealthy. . . . That does not make its 
use unlawful or inappropriate; it simply means that this 
factor cannot make up for the failure of other factors, such 
as “reprehensibility,” to constrain significantly an award 
that purports to punish a defendant’s conduct.272 
On its own, this passage could suggest that Breyer sees the need 
for some retributive upper limit—grounded in the reprehensibil-
ity of a defendant’s conduct—to constrain punitive awards  
driven by the wealth of a defendant. Later, however, Breyer 
frames his conclusion in nonretributive terms—that is, as a fail-
ure by the Alabama Supreme Court to provide any economic ra-
tionale connecting the size of the award to the state’s interests, 
nor any other community understanding, historical practice, or 
legislative standard to explain the award as something other 
than unfettered discretion.273 A system of income-based fines, 
grounded in a theory of effective deterrence and subjective retri-
bution, and proportioning punishment according to a set  
formula, would presumably escape the same verdict. As the 
 
 270 Id at 567. 
 271 BMW, 517 US at 588 (Breyer concurring). 
 272 Id at 591 (Breyer concurring) (citations omitted). 
 273 See id at 593 (Breyer concurring) (“The record before us, however, contains noth-
ing suggesting that the Alabama Supreme Court, when determining the allowable 
award, applied any ‘economic’ theory that might explain the $2 million recovery.”), citing 
Browning-Ferris, 492 US at 300 (O’Connor concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(noting that the Constitution “does not incorporate the views of the Law and Economics 
School,” nor does it “require the States to subscribe to any particular economic theory”). 
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Court has elsewhere observed, variation in punitive damages 
awards “might be acceptable or even desirable if they result 
from judges’ and juries’ refining their judgments to reach a gen-
erally accepted optimal level of penalty and deterrence . . . while 
producing fairly consistent results in cases with similar facts.”274 
Finally, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co v 
Campbell,275 the Court invalidated an award of $145 million in 
punitive damages that the Utah Supreme Court rationalized, in 
part, by reference to the defendant corporation’s substantial as-
sets.276 In finding that award far in excess of constitutional lim-
its, the Court observed that the defendant’s wealth was one of 
many factors considered by the Utah Supreme Court that “had 
little to do with the actual harm sustained by the [plaintiffs].”277 
And citing Breyer’s concurrence in BMW, the Court declared—
with frustratingly little explanation—that “[t]he wealth of a de-
fendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive 
damages award.”278 Perhaps the most natural reading of that 
statement reflects a retributive view: that wealth cannot drive 
too great a departure from deserts. But it is also susceptible to a 
nonretributive one: that a state taking wealth into account must 
explain how doing so meaningfully furthers its interests—in 
other words, that wealth is not a trump card that renders a 
damages award, otherwise unhinged from the state’s legitimate 
interests, per se constitutional. 
Next, because the Court has imposed a rough mathematical 
constraint on the magnitude of punitive damages in civil cases, 
it is tempting to ask whether a similar rule could be transposed 
into the context of excessive fines. Though “reluctant to identify 
concrete constitutional limits on the ratio between harm, or po-
tential harm, to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award” 
the Court has said that, “in practice, few awards exceeding a 
single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, 
to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”279 Punitive 
damages within the single-digit range, by contrast, “are more 
likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the 
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State’s goals of deterrence and retribution,” than higher-ratio 
awards.280 Thus, it has for example struck down punitive dam-
ages awards that were 145 times281 and 500 times282 the compen-
satory amount. 
Translating this rule into the excessive fines context would 
do little to help guide courts in applying the gross disproportion-
ality standard, at least when the offense itself does not express 
harm as a monetary value. Consideration of the “ratio” of puni-
tive damages to harm rests on “a piece of information that 
[most] criminal cases” and most civil offenses lack: “[A]n indica-
tion of the gravity of the offense that uses the very currency in 
which punishment is to be meted out.”283 To be sure, some civil 
and criminal offenses offer an indication, albeit incomplete, of 
monetary loss: in New York, for example, grand larceny in the 
fourth degree is the theft of property worth more than $1,000.284 
But in the typical case, such as distribution of narcotics or a 
speeding ticket, the harm caused by an offense is never defined 
in monetary terms. If the Court were nonetheless inclined to 
find some objective, mathematical rule of thumb to rein in the 
role that income may play in setting fines, there are options 
available. For instance, it could fix a ratio between the absolute 
value of the lowest and highest authorized fines, meaning that a 
statute with a minimum fine of $10 could not, on the basis of in-
come, set a maximum higher than $100, or ten times greater. 
But given the Court’s general reluctance to adopt bright-line 
rules in its gross disproportionality jurisprudence—especially in 
the criminal context—development along these lines is unlikely. 
CONCLUSION 
Fines are a dominant feature of American life, as certain as 
death and taxes. In every facet and context, they play some role 
in regulating behavior and expressing society’s moral reproba-
tion. Perhaps because of that ubiquity, the way we impose fines 
is taken for granted, as if it were a law of nature that fines exact 
the same price from every offender, no matter her income. But 
as this Article has suggested, there is an alternative to the sta-
tus quo, and it aligns at least as well with our intuitions about 
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justice and the purposes of punishment. As more people awaken 
to the burden that criminal justice debt imposes on the poor, 
there may be an opportunity for a larger reconceptualization of 
financial sanctions. At a minimum, the tariff fine is an aspect of 
our justice system ripe for experimentation. 
As for whether the federal Constitution is any barrier to  
income-based fines, some doctrinal questions are unsettled, but 
enough is clear that governments should not hesitate to pursue 
reform out of fear that those efforts will founder in court. 
Changes that reduce the burden that tariff fines place on the 
poor, the most urgent policy task, face no obstacle. A system 
that imposed hefty financial sanctions on those at the very top of 
the income scale could face complications, but the resulting 
problems are manageable and can largely be avoided with caps 
on the size of fines. Whether or not the million-dollar parking 
ticket is desirable or constitutionally permissible, introducing 
some measure of progressivity into financial sanctions is an idea 
whose time has come. 
